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BEYOND BUDGET-CUT CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
THE FUTURE OF PENAL LAW*
MARY D. FAN**

American criminal justice is experiencing a perfect storm of
budget-cut criminal justice reform and the awakening of courts
to the role of checking penal severity. A wave of reforms is
sweeping the states as budgetary shortfalls are leading to
measures once virtually impossible or very difficult to enact such
as expanded early release, conversion of felonies to
misdemeanors, and scaling down sentences. On the judicial
front, the Supreme Court has resuscitated Eighth Amendment
proportionalityreview and reinvigoratedjudicial intervention in
penal management. This Article explores how these shifts in the
social meaning of criminal justice reform from being soft on
crime to being fiscally responsible provide both political cover
for reform and the potential for garneringbipartisansupport.At
this important historicaljuncture, the Article examines how to
transitionfrom emergency response to sustainablepenal law and
policy reform.
Recent cases such as Brown v. Pena and Graham v. Florida
demonstrate the utility and wisdom of judicial nudges when
penal politics are mired in incapacitationstagnation. Ultimately,
however, guides and constraintsgoverning the politicalbranches
are needed for sustainable change. The Article analyzes the
potential of what it terms "rehabilitationpragmatism" to anchor
reforms. Rehabilitation pragmatism is cautious and selective in
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choosing beneficiaries and attentive to the need for evidence of
efficacy, cost effectiveness and success. The Article argues that as
we turn to such data-driven approaches in decision making, the
distribution of benefits and burdens across historically
disadvantaged groups should be an important component of
efficacy assessments. Performance measures should take into
account human and community as well as fiscal costs. The
Article also advocates penal impact analysis to curb the tendency
to enact a thicket of criminal laws without consideration of
systemic costs. Penal impact analysis provides for front-end
examination of the fiscal consequences of criminal legislation,
curbing the pathologicalpolitics of crime.
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THE FUTURE OF PENAL LAW
INTRODUCTION

A wave of penal law and policy reforms is sweeping the states as
severe budget shortfalls are leading to measures once very tough, and
arguably virtually impossible, to enact because of the political risk of
looking soft on crime. States are implementing reforms such as earlier
release of prisoners, conversion of felonies to misdemeanors, and
redefining and scaling down the sentences for nonviolent crimes.
Exploring alternatives to prison and early release has potential
bipartisan support, redefined as a way to curb wasteful and
destructive spending rather than being soft on criminals.2 The
potential of the social meaning shift is demonstrated by recent calls to
action by Newt Gingrich and Pat Nolan, and bipartisan measures
sponsored in customarily conservative tough-on-crime states such as
Texas.' On the judicial front, the Supreme Court has resuscitated
Eighth Amendment proportionality review in the noncapital context
1. See, e.g., Monica Davey, Safety Is Issue As Budget Cuts Free Prisoners, N.Y.
Mar. 4, 2010, at Al (describing a wave of state reforms relieving budgetary
pressures by expanding early release programs and offering sentence reductions); Jessica
Fender, Governor Ritter Signs Bundle of Bills To Promote Rehabilitation of Criminals,
DENV. POST, May 25, 2010, at 1A, available at http://www.denverpost.com/ci_15154787
(reporting on passage of bipartisan measures to relieve the budgetary pressures of
incarceration such as scaling down sentences for drug crimes, widening eligibility for
parole, and lessening penalties for technical parole violations); Ray Long, Monique Garcia
& David Heinzmann, Truth-Squading the Governor Race, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 29, 2010, at 6
(noting political fallout from controversial early release reform to reduce budgetary
pressure); Marty Roney, 36 States Offer Release to Ill or Dying Inmates, USA TODAY, Jan.
31, 2011, at 4A (reporting on wave of states enacting early release for ill or dying to cut
costs); Cheryl Cadue, Budget Cuts Challenge Progress Made by States and Elicit Even
Smarter Reforms, ALLBUSINESS (Feb. 1, 2010), http://www.allbusiness.com/crime-lawenforcement-corrections/corrections-parole/14359499-1.html (detailing the reinstatement
of early release programs to stem budget woes in several states); see also, e.g., Editorial,
Inmates Who Should Walk, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 2009, at A16 (detailing a bipartisan plan
by Virginia legislators to save taxpayers millions by giving prison officials discretion to
release nonviolent offenders up to ninety days earlier).
2. See infra Part III.A.
3. The calls to action by Newt Gingrich and Pat Nolan hit newspapers across the
nation in January 2011. See, e.g., Newt Gingrich & Pat Nolan, Right Looking To Lead
Fightfor Prison Reform, FORT WAYNE J. GAZETTE, Jan. 12, 2011, at 7A, available at 2011
WLNR 700878; Newt Gingrich & Pat Nolan, "Right on Crime": Time for Courage on
Prison Reforms, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Jan. 9, 2011, at B9, availableat 2011 WLNR
578735; Newt Gingrich & Pat Nolan, Save Money, Save Lives, PITTrSBURGH POSTGAZETTE, Jan. 28, 2011, at B7, available at 2011 WLNR 1759279; Newt Gingrich & Pat
Nolan, Saving Money, Saving Lives, VA. PILOT & LEDGER-STAR, Jan. 19, 2011, at 7,
available at 2011 WLNR 1141910; Newt Gingrich & Pat Nolan, Saving Money, Saving
Lives, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2011, at A17, available at 2011 WLNR 1530349; Newt Gingrich
& Pat Nolan, Time To Rethink Rehabilitation,N.Y. POST, Jan. 8, 2011, at 17, available at
2011 WLNR 551374. For discussion of the bipartisan Colorado and Texas measures, see
infra Part IV.A.
TIMES,
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to constrain penal harshness.4 The Court has also affirmed a prisoner
release order "of unprecedented sweep and extent" requiring
California to reduce its prison population to 137.5% of design
capacity within two years. The order necessitates the release of as
many as 46,000 prisoners to ameliorate Eighth Amendment violations
in the provision of health and mental care to prisoners.6
Is a revolution in penal law and policy in the making? A rich and
abundant body of literature has decried the ever-intensifying
harshness of American criminal justice mired in "the pathological
politics of criminal law.",7 This Article explores the future of penal law
and policy after the turn to budget-cut criminal justice reform and the
recent awakening of courts to address the crippling human and fiscal
costs of our incarceration nation. From three institutional dimensions,
the Article explores the role of courts, legislators, and criminal justice
experts in transitioning from emergency response to sustainable penal
law and policy reform.

4. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028-33 (2010) (categorically invalidating a
sentence of life imprisonment without parole for "juvenile nonhomicide offenders"
because the sentence foreswore "altogether the rehabilitative ideal," offering "no chance
for reconciliation with society, no hope" of demonstrating reform and rehabilitation after
a crime committed while "a child in the eyes of the law").
5. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011).
6. Id.; see also Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, Nos. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, C011351 TEH, 2010 WL 99000, at *3-5 (E.D. Cal. & N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2010) (ordering a
reduction in prison population), appeal granted sub nom., Schwarzenegger v. Plata, 130 S.
Ct. 3413, 3413 (2010) (deferring jurisdictional issues to hearing on merits); Coleman v.
Schwarzenegger, Nos. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, C01-1351 TEH, 2009 WL 2430820, at
*84, *106, *116 (E.D. Cal. & N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009) (ordering California to design a plan
to reduce its prison population to 137.5% of design capacity within two years,
necessitating release of between 38,000 and 46,000 prisoners to ameliorate pathological
consequences of overcrowding).
7. William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 509-12, 529-39 (2001) [hereinafter Stuntz, Pathological Politics]; see also, e.g.,
DEIRDRE GOLASH, THE CASE AGAINST PUNISHMENT: RETRIBUTION, CRIME
PREVENTION, AND THE LAW 3, 29-35 (2006); MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE

195-207 (2d ed. 2006); Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks
of ConstitutionalSentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145,
1149, 1193-96, 1205 (2009); Sara Sun Beale, What's Law Got To Do with It? The Political,
Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of
(Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRiM. L. REV. 23, 25-32 (1997); William J.Stuntz, The
Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 781, 785-86 (2006)
[hereinafter Stuntz, Political Constitution]. See generally Robert Batey, The Costs of
Judicial Restraint: Forgone Opportunities To Limit America's Imprisonment Binge, 33
NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 29 (2007) (arguing for increased efforts by

the courts to decrease incarceration and noting judicial activism may reduce rates of
incarceration).
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This Article contends that the future of penal law will be
oriented by what it terms "rehabilitation pragmatism," which is a
cautious turn away from incapacitation-warehousing people away8
as the primary consideration in penal policy. Rehabilitation
pragmatism is a return of hope for reclamation-but not the idealistic
hope of general reclamation of offenders under the rehabilitative
ideal that held sway from the 1890s to 1960s. 9 The new approach is
cautious and selective in the choice of beneficiaries, attentive to the
need for evidence of efficacy, cost effectiveness, and success.1"
Rehabilitation pragmatism subjects cloistered experts to a demand
for evidence that ameliorates the opacity and seemingly unfettered
discretion critiqued during the heyday of the rehabilitative ideal."
In tandem with the move toward data-driven rehabilitation
pragmatism, this Article advocates penal impact analysis in criminal
legislation and politics. Penal impact analysis renders legislators
accountable for the fiscal consequences of the politics of crime. Penal
impact analysis redresses part of what makes the politics of crime
pathological-the tendency to ratchet up penal severity without
allocating sufficient resources to enforce the laws or examining
cumulative system impact.
Rehabilitation pragmatism and penal impact analysis are
concepts suffused with multiple meanings with appeal across a broad
political spectrum, including cost reduction and cost effectiveness.12
These orienting frameworks can help bridge the usually fiercely
partisan worldviews on crime and punishment and clear the threshold
hurdle in criminal justice reform of political inertia and deadlock.13
Indeed, public opinion pollsters have found that public taste for
intermediate sanctions increases when respondents are given
information about the costs of prisons.14 In places where politics
remain mired in incapacitation stagnation with destructive human

8. See infra Part IV.A.

9. See infra Part IV.A.
10. Infra Part IV.A.
11. See infra Part I.A.
12. See infra Part IV.
13. See Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 145-48
(2007) (arguing that law and policy should be infused with a surfeit of meanings-an
approach he calls "expressive overdetermination"-so that divergent worldviews can be
simultaneously affirmed and people in a pluralistic society can deliberate and work withrather than work past and at odds with-each other in controversial contexts).
14. Francis T. Cullen, Bonnie S. Fisher & Brandon K. Applegate, Public Opinion
About Punishmentand Corrections,27 CRIME & JUST. 1, 41 (2000).
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consequences, recent Eighth Amendment doctrinal shifts give courts
room to nudge penal law and politics along.15
This Article also sounds a caution, however. We must take care
that this new selective and cautious approach does not aggravate
another persistent criminal justice problem: inequities in who bears
the burdens of penal severity and who are the beneficiaries of
measures of mercy. This Article argues that as we demand more
evidence of rehabilitative program efficacy, performance measures
should also be sensitive to whether there are disparate distributions of
benefits and burdens. To ameliorate disparities, the Article advocates
approaches to rehabilitative programming that take cultural and
racial context into account. The goal is a richer, farther-reaching
understanding of success.
The Article unfolds as follows. Part I explores how we have
reached a potential tipping point in unsustainable incapacitation
domination. Part II examines the judicial awakening in 2010 to
nudging-and in the case of Plata v. Brown,16 downright pushingstate politics out of incapacitation stagnation. Part III explores how
state budgetary emergencies have prompted what politics as usual
had long prevented-a wave of penal law and policy reforms, the
most prevalent of which are shallow, broad-based back-end sentence
reductions and early release, accompanied by cuts to programs for
rehabilitation and community reintegration. This Part argues that the
release-valve practice of reform, in the absence of orienting
approaches for managing long-term consequences, can be dangerous
and lead to backlash and sharp reversion. Not all is bleak, however.
Budget-cut reforms can pose great promise for reorientation in
addition to' the pitfalls.
Drawing on exemplars, Part IV offers orienting frameworks for
reform beyond emergency response and explores how rehabilitative
pragmatism and penal impact analysis can support a sustainable
transformation of penal law and policy. This Part also cautions for
care during this shift toward rehabilitation pragmatism so as not to
aggravate the persistent problem of inequities in who bears the
burdens of penal harshness and who benefits from the system's mercy
and redemptive impulses. The Part concludes by examining the
judicial role during the penal law and policy fomentation and the
utility and wisdom of judicial nudges when penal law and politics are
mired in incapacitation stagnation.
15.

See infra Part I.B.
16. 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
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I.

INCAPACITATION STAGNATION AT THE TIPPING POINT

To understand the import of the present opportunity for
reorientation, a brief history of our recent past and journey to our
present mire as an incarceration nation offers perspective. At stake is
whether we extricate ourselves from incapacitation stagnation. This
Part explores our journey to this tipping point, the human and fiscal
counts that have mounted along the way, and the need for a jolt out
of incapacitation stagnation that criminal law and politics as usual
cannot supply.
A.

Hope, Dimmed but Not Dead

For much of the twentieth century, the prevailing orientation of
American criminal justice was rehabilitation and hope for
redemption, centered on the belief that the system and its sentences
should reform the offender. 7 Dubbed the rehabilitative ideal, the
prevalent penal approach reflected faith in modern therapeutic
intervention as well as older Western beliefs in punishment as loving
chastisement meant to correct and improve the offender. 8 Oriented
by this penal philosophy, the American incarceration rate of around
100 per 100,000 people in the population was in line with much of the
democratic West until approximately 1975.1" Despair over surging

17. For influential discussions of this history, see, e.g., FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE
DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 18-19 (1981); DAVID GARLAND, THE
CULTURE OF CONTROL 8-20, 28-73, 90-102, 105-37 (2001); JONATHAN SIMON,
GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 149-51 (2007). For writings capturing
the hope of the prevailing rationale of times past, see, e.g., Charlton T. Lewis, The
Indeterminate Sentence, 9 YALE L.J. 17, 20-21 (1899) (envisioning "the conversion of the
prison into an institution combining the means and aims of hospital, school and church, for
the healing ... of body, mind and will"); Alexander Winter, The Modern Spirit in
Penology, 8 POL. SCI. Q. 445, 445, 453-54 (1893) ("But to be just, conscientious and
humane, demands first of all that the spirit of revenge be abandoned .... To secure full
recognition for the importance, the value and the sacredness of the individual, is the
simple and only problem of modern sociology as well as of penology; and the widely
prevalent notion that the crime should be punished, not the criminal, requires to be
reformed, to be humanized and civilized. Just as we study the causes and consequences of
a disease in a man in order to cure and remove it, so we must study the causes and
consequences of criminality in the individual if we want to heal and remove it.... [T]he
criminal, for his own interests as well as the interests of society, is prevented from moving
freely about until he is cured from his criminal proclivity ... ").
18. See, e.g., ALLEN, supra note 17, at 4-5 (offering intellectual history).
19. See, e.g., Bruce Western & Christopher Wildeman, Punishment, Inequality and the
Future of Mass Incarceration, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 851, 858-59 fig.2 (2009) (displaying
trends in data); David Cole, Can Our Shameful Prisons Be Reformed?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS,
Nov. 19, 2009, at 41, available at http://www.nybooks.com/artices/archives/2009/nov/19
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crime rates, collapse of faith in government institutions to successfully
rehabilitate, and a governance structure highly responsive to flare-ups
of passion and Manichean crusading led to the decline of the
rehabilitative ideal beginning in the 1970s.2" Fueled by anger and
hopelessness, incapacitation, and vengeful impulses sometimes
confused for retributivism grew unabashedly ascendant. 2'
Broadly speaking, there are two main categories of rationales for
punishment.22 The first worldview is deontological, also termed
retributivist, and associated with thinkers such as Immanuel Kant.
This perspective justifies punishment based on the moral culpability
of the offender because of the criminal act.23 While retributivists
proffer various sophisticated accounts of why punishment is a moral
imperative, the worldview is oft caricaturized as a thirst for
vengeance, to the chagrin of retributivists.2 4 The second perspective is

/can-our-shameful-prisons-be-reformed/ (offering a history of the growth of incarceration
since 1975).
20. GARLAND, supra note 17, at 9, 69-70, 130-34; FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING &
GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF
CRIME 3-10 (1995); see also, e.g., DOUGLAS LIPTON, ROBERT MARTINSON & JUDITH
WILKS, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT: A SURVEY OF

TREATMENT EVALUATION STUDIES 175 n.* (1975) (observing that "[g]iven the large
investment most correctional systems have made in counseling and casework, it is

surprising that few experimental studies of the efficacy of such treatment, independent of
other treatments, have been conducted" and concluding, based on analysis of 231 studies
of rehabilitative programs, that evidence of efficacy was lacking); ANDREW VON HIRSCH,
DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 17-18 (1976) (noting "few programs
seem to succeed; and it is still uncertain to what extent the claimed successes would
survive replication"); JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 45-52 (1975) (noting
that evidence of program efficacy is lacking and arguing for a shift from criminologists'

preoccupation with the root social causes of crime to evaluating policy efficacy); Robert
Martinson, What Works?-Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INT. 22,
23-25 (1974) (reviewing the literature concluding that rehabilitative efforts in general,
with few exceptions, had no appreciable impact on reducing recidivism). For an
illuminating rebuttal of customary accounts of why American penal severity has
outstripped all other cultures and analysis of the influence of a paranoid strain in politics,
Manichean worldviews, a governance structure that enables law to swing with the
passions, and the tortured history of American race relations, see Michael Tonry,
Explanations of American Punishment Policies: A National History, 11 PUNISHMENT &
SOC'Y 377, 378-79, 382-90 (2009).
21. GARLAND, supra note 17, at 8-9, 69-70.
22. See, e.g., Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal Theory and
Policy, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1240 (2005) (explaining deontological and
consequentialist theories of punishment).
23. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 416-17 (2000)
(explaining retributivism); Tonry, supra note 22, at 1240 (explaining the deontological
worldview).
24. See, e.g., David Gray, Punishment As Suffering, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1619, 1657
(2010) (discussing this confusion).
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consequentialist, also termed the instrumentalist or utilitarian
worldview, which justifies punishment based on the social benefitssuch as deterrence, rehabilitation, or incapacitation of offendersthat it produces.
Penal politics do not follow the elegant intricacies of the
philosopher's

categories. 26

Broadly,

however,

the

prevalent

approaches were oft couched in terms of incapacitation and
aggressive visions of just deserts. 27 States turned to enacting
mandatory minimums, which lengthened sentences for offenses and

eliminated or strongly curtailed the discretion to release prisoners
early. 28 Under the aegis of "truth-in-sentencing" reforms aimed at
ensuring that prisoners serve the sentence pronounced in court,
numerous jurisdictions limited or even eliminated longstanding
sentence-mitigating measures and incentives to rehabilitate, such as
early release, good time credits, and parole. 29 Losing faith in the

ability of the state to rehabilitate or even deter criminals decried as
recidivating at alarming rates, the nation increasingly focused on

25. See, e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andy Hessick, Recognizing Constitutional
Rights at Sentencing, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 47, 88 (2011) (explaining the utilitarian
perspective).
26. Nor apparently, do the punitive intuitions of everyday people strictly distinguish
between moral desert and instrumental factors such as treatability and prevention. See,
e.g., Christopher Slobogin & Lauren Brinkley-Rubinstein, Putting Desert in its Place 17-18
(Vanderbilt Law Sch., Working Paper No. 3, 2011) (draft on file with the North Carolina
Law Review) (presenting experimental findings that people's views about punishment are
influenced by more than moral intuitions about desert, including utilitarian considerations
such as treatability and relative risk).
27. See, e.g., Frank 0. Bowman, III, Debacle: How the Supreme Court Has Mangled
American Sentencing Law and How It Might Yet Be Mended, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 367, 368
(2010) (summarizing the history).
28. For an exploration of the harshening trend, see, e.g., MAUER, supra note 7, at 4091.
29. PAULA M. DITrON & DORIS JAMES WILSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS 2-3 tbl.1 (1999), available at http://bjs.ojp
.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/tssp.pdf (surveying the reforms across the states; see, e.g.,
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 214-215, 224, 226, 235-236, 98 Stat.
1837, 1937-2040 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.
(2006)) (eliminating parole eligibility for all federal offenders committing crimes on or
after November 1, 1987); Parole Commission Phaseout Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-232,
110 Stat. 3055 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551 note, 4201 note (2006)) (phasing out parole
commission in light of Sentencing Reform Act elimination of parole eligibility, though
extending term for prisoners sentenced under prior law); Act of Jan. 15, 1984, ch. 459, § 5,
1983 Me. Laws 1278, 1293 (effectively repealing parole); TIMOTHY HUGHES ET AL.,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, TRENDS IN STATE PAROLE, 1990-2000, at 1-2 (2001),
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/tspOO.pdf (noting that sixteen states
had eliminated discretionary release by 2000).
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incapacitating them in prisons away from society to contain the risk of
harm they posed.
In a short span of history, the United States became the number
one incarceration nation in the world by per capita incarceration rate,
with one out of every thirty-seven adults either incarcerated or having
spent time in jail by 2003. 30 Today, one-quarter of all incarcerated
people in the world are imprisoned in the United States, though the
United States has only five percent of the world population. 1 The
United States has a per capita rate of incarceration that is more than
seven times that of Western European democracies with a similar
intellectual heritage.3 2 The next closest countries in line for the
dubious distinction of having the world's highest incarceration rate
are Russia and Rwanda, which run a distant second and third,
respectively.33 The United States incarcerates 753 people per 100,000
of the population-a nearly 20% greater rate than second-place
Russia, which incarcerates 629 per 100,000, and more than 25%
greater rate than Rwanda, which incarcerates 593 per 100,000. 4
Times and crime rates have dramatically changed since despair
over surging crime rates fueled the ascendency of incapacitation by
incarceration as the prevalent penal approach of our times. Crime
rates have been falling substantially for more than a decade,
beginning in the mid-1990s.35 Violent crime rates have remained low
and declined through the recession, bucking ominous predictions that
the recession would push up crime rates.3 6 Oft-proffered reasons for
the great crime decline include such overarching demographic
30. Gail Russell Chaddock, US Notches World's Highest Incarceration Rate,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 18,2003, at 2, availableat http://www.csmonitor.com
/2003/0818/p02s0l-usju.html (reporting figure from 2003, when the government began

releasing data on the extent of imprisonment).
31. Silja J.A. Talvi, IncarcerationNation, THE NATION (Jan. 22, 2007), http://www
.thenation.com/article/incarceration-nation.
32. Western & Wildeman, supra note 19, at 857-59 fig.1 (displaying incarceration
data).
33. JOHN SCHMITn, KRIS WARNER & SARIKA GUPTA, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY
RESEARCH, THE HIGH BUDGETARY COST OF INCARCERATION 2, 4-5 fig.2 (2010),
availableat http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/incarceration-2010-06.pdf.

34. Id.
35. MICHAEL R. RAND, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, NAT'L CRIME
VICTIMIZATION SURVEY: CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2008, at 1-3 (2009), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv08.pdf; Vanessa Barker, Explaining the Great

American Crime Decline: A Review of Blumstein and Wallman, Goldbergerand Rosenfeld,
and Zimring, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 489, 490 (2010); Allison Klein, Major Cities'
Plummeting Crime Rates Mystifying, WASH. POST, July 20,2009, at Al.
36. Evan Perez, Violent Crime Falls Sharply, WALL ST. J. (May 25, 2010), http://online
.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704113504575264432463469618.html.
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changes as the large baby boomer population aging out of prime
crime-committing years and a reduction in the most crime-prone
demographic-young juvenile males born to impoverished families
unable to care for them-as well as strategy shifts in policing and
incarceration.3" Regardless of the precise mix of reasons, the point is
that the needs of our time have shifted.
Just as the law of criminal procedure responds to shifts in the
nature and extent of crime concerns, with the 1960s shift in criminal
procedure protections made possible by the low-crime 1950s,38 so too
should the prevalent penal approaches be responsive to shifts in the
nature and extent of crime concerns. Penal law and policy should shift
from the panic mode of the past, at least for ordinary crimes and
criminals, particularly as we reach the point of diminishing or even
perversely inverse returns for investment in incarceration. Scholars
and practitioners in the field have been sounding the alarm for a long
time about how high rates of incarceration erode community
constraints to crime, exposing greater proportions of the population
to the criminogenic conditions of prison and posing crippling financial
39
as well human, social, and community costs.
Public opinion has shifted toward support for rehabilitative and
preventative measures as crime rates go down and the costs of
maintaining an incarceration society keep going up." For example, a
37. E.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 57-103

(2007) (analyzing prevalent explanations and debunking overly optimistic tendency to
credit policy changes for crime rate shift); Steven D. Levitt, UnderstandingWhy Crime Fell
in the 1990s: Four Factors That Explain the Decline and Six That Do Not, 18 J. ECON.

PERSP., Winter 2004, at 163, 170-83 (attributing the crime decline to the legalization of
abortion, more police, increased incarceration, and the waning of the crack epidemic);
William Spelman, The Limited Importance of PrisonExpansion, in THE CRIME DROP IN
AMERICA 97, 123-24 (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds., 2006) (analyzing data and
concluding violent crime rate would have dropped substantially anyhow without the
incarceration ramp up but the incarceration ramp up increased the extent of drop by a
quarter).
38. William J. Stuntz, Local PolicingAfter the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2138, 215052 (2002).

39. See, e.g., PAUL BUTLER, LET'S GET FREE 23-40 (2009) (explaining why more
imprisonment can make us less safe because of desensitization and disruption of
communities); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Costs of Mass Incarcerationin
African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1281-96 (2004) (analyzing the

burdens of high incarceration on communities of color). See generally Dina R. Rose &
Todd R. Clear, Incarceration, Social Capital, and Crime: Implications for Social
Disorganization Theory, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 441, 442-78 (1998) (explaining mechanisms

and costs of social disorganization).
40. See, e.g., PETER D. HART RESEARCH ASSOCS., INC., OPEN SOC'Y INST.,
CHANGING PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 2-3 (2002)

[hereinafter OPEN SOC'Y INST.]; SIMON, supra note 17, at 11 (noting the mounting
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2002 Open Society Institute-commissioned poll of a demographically
representative sample of adults found that 66% of respondents
believed "the best way to reduce crime is to rehabilitate prisoners by
requiring education and job training so they have the tools to turn
away from a life of crime. '"41 In contrast, only 28% of the 1,056
respondents believed "keeping criminals off the streets through long
prison sentences would be ... more effective. 42 Indeed, public
support for the goal of rehabilitation never died, even though it
waned during the time of punitive anger over the seemingly
unstoppable crime surge in the late 1960s through 1980s.43 A 1968
Harris poll indicated that about 73% of respondents believed
rehabilitation should be the main goal of punishment." By 1982, the
support for rehabilitation had dropped to 44%." Support increased
again by 2001, with more than 55% of respondents in a nationwide
46
poll indicating that rehabilitation should be the main goal of prisons.
The difficulty is that for more than a decade, we have been
caught in a one-way ratchet and a rut. Once the national mood turns
grim, it is much easier to accelerate penal severity and much harder to
shift course, even if the lessons of experience counsel for change.
Politicians cannot afford to look soft on crime and have much to gain
by taking tough symbolic stands, even when they think the resulting
punishment would be too harsh in most cases.47 The interests of
politicians intersect with that of prosecutors, whose power and
discretion expand with an ever-broadening and -deepening arsenal of

skepticism of Americans toward harsh prison sentences and preference for a return to a
greater emphasis on rehabilitation); Shelley Johnson Listwan et al., Cracks in the Penal
Harm Movement: Evidence from the Field, 7 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 423,427 (2008)

(collecting studies to show evidence of support for moving away from harsh penological
responses to crime); Daniel S. Nagin et al., Public Preferences for Rehabilitation Versus
Incarceration of Juvenile Offenders: Evidence from a Contingent Valuation Survey, 5
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 627,629-30 (2006).
41. OPEN SOC'Y INST., supra note 40, at 4.
42. Id. at 4, 19.
43. Francis T. Cullen et al., Public Support for CorrectionalRehabilitationin America:
Change or Consistency?, in CHANGING ATTITUDES TO PUNISHMENT: PUBLIC OPINION,
CRIME AND JUSTICE 128,143-44 (Julian V. Roberts & Mike Hough eds., 2002).

44. Cullen et al., supra note 14, at 49 tbl.1.
45. Id.
46. Cullen et al., supra note 43, at 135.
47. For influential accounts of the politics of crime, see, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The
Essential but Inherently Limited Role of the Courts in Prison Reform, 13 BERKELEY J.
CRIM. L. 307, 310 (2008); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's
DisappearingShadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2558 (2004); Michael Tonry, The Mostly
Unintended Effects of Mandatory Penalties: Two Centuries of Consistent Findings, 38
CRIME & JUST. 65, 100-02 (2009).
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crimes and harsh penalties that can be leveraged as incentive to
secure guilty pleas.48 There is a weak constituency against tough
legislation because those whose interests are impacted mostcriminals and judges who have their discretion constrained by gettough techniques like mandatory minimums-are hardly in the
position to lobby. 49 The result is incapacitation stagnation-the
entrenchment of harsh incarceration policies despite shifts in popular
needs and a coming-to-consciousness regarding the steep toll such
policies exact.
B.

The Building Pressureof Human and Fiscal Costs

For more than a decade the United States has been mired in
incapacitation stagnation as the fiscal and human costs have mounted.
Today one in thirty-one adults is under some form of correctional
control, either in jail or prison or on probation or parole.5" Because of
the disproportionate incarceration of men and African Americans,
the numbers are even more striking when further broken down-one
in eighteen men and one in eleven African Americans are under
correctional control.5 1 The "odds of an African American man going
to prison today are higher than the odds he will go to college [or] get
married"5 2 and incarceration is now "a pervasive event in the lives of
poor and minority men" 5 3-stark portraits of the structure of life
a commonplace
As incarceration becomes
opportunities.
phenomenon in disadvantaged communities, the prospect of prison
loses the deterrent force of stigma. s4 Moreover, high rates of
48. Stuntz, supra note 47, at 2558. For further background, see, e.g., Mary De Ming
Fan, DiscipliningCriminalJustice: The Peril Amid the Promiseof Numbers, 26 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 1, 43 (2007) (discussing incentives to leverage charging power); Daniel C.
Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone's Revenge: An Essay on the PoliticalEconomy of
Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 623-24 (2005) (exploring prosecutors'
interests in having a plethora of charging options).
49. Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 725-26 (2005);
Rachel E.Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989,
1029-30 (2006).
50. PEW CrR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 31: THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN
CORRECTIONS 1 (2009), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles

/PSPPlin3lreportFINALWEB_3-26-09.pdf.
51. Id.
52. JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 141

(2007).
53. IMPRISONING AMERICA: THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF MASS INCARCERATION 3

(Mary Pattillo, David Weiman & Bruce Western eds., 2004).
54. See BUTLER, supra note 39, at 33, 133 (noting perverse consequences of the
destigmatization of prison in communities with high incarceration rates).
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incarceration may aggravate disparities in political power because of
the concentration of felon disenfranchisement in communities already
underrepresented at the ballot box.55
The mounting costs and incarceration ramp ups produce
diminishing gains and may even have reached the tipping point where
more incarceration becomes criminogenic both within packed prison
walls and outside in communities living in the shadow of high rates of
incarceration. There is widespread agreement among scholars that
the United States is likely to experience diminishing marginal returns
as we continue to increase incarceration.56 There is also evidence
indicating that states with high incarceration rates have reached an
inflection point where increasing incarceration is actually associated
with a lack of effectiveness on crime rates.57 This should not be
surprising. As we lock more and more people up, we begin to
incarcerate not just the most dangerous but also the less dangerous,
for whom incapacitation does not buy society as much safety, and
who may be doing more good as fathers, brothers, and sons in
communities-often communities of color-disrupted by high rates of
incarceration of the men.5"

55. See, e.g., Angela Behrens, Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Ballot Manipulation
and the "Menace of Negro Domination": Racial Threat and Felon Disenfranchisementin
the United States, 1850-2002, 109 AM. J. Soc. 559, 560, 598-99 (2003) (collecting literature
on the dilution of political power among communities of color by felon
disenfranchisement laws and tracing history); Pamela S. Karlan, Conviction and Doubts:
Retribution, Representation, and the Debate over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 1147, 1161-62, 1162 n.76 (2004) (noting the dynamics of underrepresentation, race,
and political protections).
56. ZIMRING, supra note 37, at 51-52 (noting that "[e]very serious commentator on
incapacitation has pointed out this likelihood" of diminishing returns, and citing
examples). See generally JAMES AUSTIN & TONY FABELO, JFA INST., THE DIMINISHING
RETURNS OF INCREASED INCARCERATION: A BLUEPRINT To IMPROVE PUBLIC SAFETY

AND REDUCE COSTS (2004), availableat http://www.jfa-associates.com/BlueprintFinal.pdf
(discussing diminishing returns); RYAN S. KING, MARC MAUER & MALCOLM C. YOUNG,
THE SENTENCING PROJECT, INCARCERATION AND CRIME: A COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP

(2005), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc-iandc-complex
.pdf (same).
57. Raymond V. Liedka, Anne Morrison Piehl & Bert Useem, The Crime-Control
Effect of Incarceration:Does Scale Matter?, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 245, 270, 272
(2006).
58. See BUTLER, supra note 39, at 23-40 (arguing that more imprisonment can make
us less safe because of desensitization and disruption of communities); ZIMRING, supra
note 37, at 52 (noting that to increase incarceration "the system must have been dipping
much deeper into the dangerousness barrel, if not scraping its bottom"); Roberts, supra
note 39, at 1281-96 (analyzing the burdens of high incarceration on communities of color);
Rose & Clear, supra note 39, at 442-78 (explaining mechanisms and costs of social
disorganization).
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Moreover, prisons may exert a criminogenic effect, brutalizing
the inmate further, facilitating the creation of a criminal network,
providing an education in criminality, and consolidating a criminal
identity.5 9 There is evidence that imprisonment has a particularly
pronounced criminogenic effect on drug offenders who recidivate
more quickly and at higher rates following incarceration than those
similarly situated put on probation.6" This should be particularly
troubling because drug offenders have been described as "the single
most important cause of the trebling of the prison population in the

United States since 1980. " 6I
For these diminishing and potentially perverse returns, budgetstrapped states and the nation are paying crippling financial costs.
The fiscal burden has dramatically increased as incarceration has
surged 240% between 1980 and 2008.62 In 2008, the $68 billion total
spent on prisons was a 336% increase from the fiscal burden two and
a half decades ago. 63 The heavy costs of prisons-the second-fastest
increasing general fund expenditure after Medicare-deprives
budget-strapped states of money for essential services such as
education, which is suffering severe cuts.' In 2008, the nation spent
$75 billion on corrections-the majority of the cost on incarceration.6 5

59. See, e.g., Lynne M. Vieraitis, Tomislav V. Kovandzic & Thomas B. Marvell, The
Criminogenic Effects of Imprisonment: Evidence from State Panel Data: 1974-2002, 6
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 589, 591-93 (2007).
60. Cassia Spohn & David Holleran, The Effect of Imprisonment on Recidivism Rates
of Felony Offenders: A Focus on Drug Offenders, 40 CRIMINOLOGY 329, 330, 345 (2002).
61.

MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT-RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN

AMERICA 81 (1995).
62. See SCHMITT ET AL., supra note 33, at 2,5-6.
63. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 50, at 11.
64.

See, e.g., NAACP, MISPLACED

PRIORITIES: OVER

INCARCERATE,

UNDER

EDUCATE 12-15 (2011), available at http://naacp.3cdn.net/01d6f368edbe135234

_bqOm68x5h.pdf (discussing how prison spending restricts funds available for education);
CHRISTINE S. SCOT-HAYWARD, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE FISCAL CRISIS IN
CORRECTIONS: RETHINKING POLICIES AND PRACTICES 3 (2009), available at http://www

.vera.org/files/The-fiscal-crisis-in-correctionsJuly-2009.pdf ("Second only to Medicaid,
corrections has become the fastest growing general fund expenditure in the United
States."); Vernon Clark, NAACP Blasts U.S. Trend for Spending More on Incarceration
than Education, PHILA. INQUIRER (Apr. 14, 2011), http://articles.philly.com/2011-04-

(reporting
on
14/news/294178211_prison-populations-incarceration-prison-growth
findings from six cities, including Philadelphia); Elizabeth Prann, States Spend Almost
Four Times More Per Capita on Incarcerating Prisoners Than Educating Students, Studies
Say, FOXNEWS.COM (Mar. 14, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/03/14/states-

(summarizing
research
spend-times-incarcerating-educating-studies-say-464156987/
findings showing most states spend "three to four times more per capita" on incarceration
than education).
65. SCHMITT ET AL., supra note 33, at 2, 10.
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To put the costs in closer perspective, to house just one prisoner in
2005, taxpayers spent an average of $23,876 a year.66 Moreover,
longer sentences mean more aging prisoners to pay for, further
straining resources because the elderly, defined as those age fifty-five
or older by the National Commission on Correctional Health Care,
cost "two to three times more" to house because of health needs.67 In
a time when at least forty-two states and the District of Columbia are
struggling with cutbacks to deal with more than $103 billion in budget
shortfalls, the crippling costs have become unsustainable.68
The fiscal and human consequences are becoming so impossible
to ignore that even traditionally fiercely tough-on-crime conservative
leaders are calling for a reorientation of the conservative stance. The
potential of bipartisan penal policy reform was recently demonstrated
by a call to action by conservatives Newt Gingrich and Pat Nolan that
hit newspapers across the nation in January 2011.69 Gingrich and
Nolan described the rise of a conservative "Right on Crime"
campaign to help states realize the need for reform:
There is an urgent need to address the astronomical growth in
the prison population, with its huge costs in dollars and lost
human potential.... If our prison policies are failing half of the
time, and we know that there are more humane, effective

66. Adam Liptak, More Than 1 in 100 Adults Are Now in Prison in U.S., N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 29, 2008, at A14.
67. TINA CHIU, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, IT'S ABOUT TIME: AGING PRISONERS,
INCREASING COSTS, AND GERIATRIC RELEASE 3-5 (2010), availableat http://www.vera

.org/download?file=2973/Its-about-time-aging-prisoners-increasing-costs-and-geriatricrelease.pdf; see also, e.g., California's Aging Prisoner: Demographics, Costs, and
Recommendations: HearingBefore the Cal. S. Subcomm. on Aging & Long Term Care, the

Cal. S. Comm. on the Cal. Corr. Sys., and the Cal. S. Pub. Safety Comm., 2003-2004 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. 26-27 (Cal. 2003) (statement of Professor Jonathan Turley), available at http://
www.prisonterminal.com/documents/AGING-PRISONERSTRANSCRIPT.pdf (noting
that elderly prisoners cost more than three times more than younger prisoners); Mike
Mitka, Aging PrisonersStressing Health Care System, 292 JAMA 423, 423 (2004) (noting

three-strikes laws, mandatory minimums, and other indicia of penal severity mean more
elderly prisoners in jail, and that elderly prisoners cost three times more for healthcare);
Tia Gubler & Joan Petersilia, Elderly Prisoners Are Literally Dying for Reform 5-6 (Jan.
23, 2006) (unpublished working paper), availableat http://www.law.stanford.edu/program
/centers/scjc/workingpapers/TGubler_06.pdf (analyzing costs and reasons for upsurge in
elderly inmates).
68. ELIZABETH McNICHOL, PHIL OLIFF & NICHOLAS JOHNSON, CTR. ON BUDGET
& POLICY PRIORITIES, STATES CONTINUE To FEEL RECESSION'S IMPACT 1 (2011), http:

//www.cbpp.org/files/9-8-08sfp.pdf (noting $103 billion in budget gaps across forty-two
states and D.C.). The data is offered as of fiscal year 2012, current through June 2011. Id.
69. For a sampling, see supra note 3.
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alternatives, it is time to fundamentally rethink how we treat
and rehabilitate our prisoners.70
Despite crippling costs and perverse consequences, however, an

emphasis on incapacitation domination, once entrenched in law, does
not recede easily. The "pathological politics of criminal law"'" is not
just scholarly postulating. It is an empirical fact demonstrated by state
experience. For example, a recent independent state investigatory
agency found that California, which has prisons straining at nearly
double intended capacity in a state of fiscal and humanitarian crisis, is

suffering a "state of emergency" because "[flor decades, governors
and lawmakers fearful of appearing soft on crime have failed to
muster the political will to address the looming crisis."72 Any attempt
to explore alternatives to incarceration and early release is fraught
with political risk because the salience of crime multiplies the

perception of public risk. If even one released offender "goes
berserk" and commits a horrific crime, political careers will end and
policy will swing sharply back, perhaps to an even more severe state. 3
The result is incapacitation stagnation, whereby the nation
continues on the costly course of punitive harshness and high
incarceration rates despite changes in public attitudes, crime context,
and mounting evidence regarding the high costs and potentially
perverse consequences.74 Penal harshness also has a drag and drift
effect in the sense that one get-tough gesture, such as sending more
juveniles to adult courts, has a host of potential ripple consequences
that may not have been deliberated over and intended, such as
70. Gingrich & Nolan, Saving Money, Saving Lives, WASH. POST, supra note 3.
71. The term was coined by Bill Stuntz. Stuntz, PathologicalPolitics, supra note 7, at
505.
72. LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, SOLVING CALIFORNIA'S CORRECTIONS CRISIS: TIME
Is RUNNING OUT, at i (2007), availableat http://www.lhc.ca.gov/studies/185/Report185
.pdf.
73. See, e.g., Vincent Carroll, Realities of Early Release, DENV. POST, Dec. 6,2009, at
3D, available at http://www.denverpost.com/commented/ci_13921492?source=commented(detailing the political dangers if a prisoner is released early because of budget-prompted
reforms and "goes berserk" as did a prisoner released early by former Arkansas Governor
Mike Huckabee); Manny Fernandez & Alison Leigh Cowan, When Horror Came to a
Connecticut Family, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2007, at Al (detailing tragedy that ensued when
two 'career criminals' released early raped, robbed, and then murdered a family).
74. See supra notes 39-49 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, 3
Strikes: Cruel, Unusual and Unfair, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2003, at A13 (commenting on
how the amendment to California's three-strikes law to curtail it to serious or violent
offenders, though supported by a majority of Californians, did not pass because "elected
officials don't want to appear soft on crime, even when the crime is shoplifting. No
politician wants to be vulnerable to a story of a shoplifter who was released and then
committed a much worse crime").
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subjecting juveniles to the possibility of life in prison without parole.7"
Enacting one measure opens the door to a whole host of harshening
consequences, leading to a severity drift effect.
II. THE JUDICIAL AWAKENING

Courts occupy an awkward position when the polity is caught in
the pathological politics of crime. Judicial artillery is clumsy and
heavy, and the judiciary is ill suited to steer the penal law and policy
choices of the political branches of the states. For two decades, the
judicial branch was hesitant to intervene, taking a hands-off, waitand-see approach that makes the recent awakening of judicial review
and intervention in penal choices all the more remarkable.
A.

Eighth Amendment ProportionalityReview of Penal Severity

The first awakening came in the context of the revival of Eighth
Amendment proportionality review of noncapital penal severity, after
years of deep fractures followed by de facto dormancy. The Eighth
Amendment prohibits the infliction of "cruel and unusual
punishments."76 The Supreme Court has read the prohibition to not
only prohibit "barbaric punishments," but also to prohibit "sentences
that are disproportionate to the crime committed."77 In the noncapital
context, the Supreme Court has fractured over application of the
proportionality principle in a series of controversial cases.78
1. Deference to the Political Branches
The Supreme Court's proportionality review cases from the
1980s through the turn of the millennium demonstrate the excesses of
incapacitation domination. In an early case, Rummel v. Estelle,7 9 in

75. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2025-26 (2010) (explaining that the
decision of many states to move away from juvenile court systems and permit more
juveniles to be transferred to adult court, making life in prison without parole possible,
"does not justify a judgment that many States intended to subject such offenders to life
without parole sentences"); see also FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN JUVENILE
JUSTICE 143-50 (2005) (analyzing the reasons for and effects of transferring more
juveniles to adult courts).
76. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
77. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983).
78. E.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003) (plurality opinion) (referring to
"narrow proportionality principle" in the noncapital context); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501
U.S. 957, 997-98 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(referring to narrow proportionality principle in the noncapital context for grossly
disproportionate sentences).
79. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
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1980, the Court rejected an Eighth Amendment proportionality
challenge to a sentence of life imprisonment for obtaining $120.75
worth of goods under false pretenses under a Texas "recidivist"
statute that levied mandatory life imprisonment on anyone convicted
of three felonies."0 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist
held that in the Eighth Amendment noncapital review context,
successful challenges would be "exceedingly rare" because of
"reluctance
to
review
legislatively
mandated
terms
of
81
imprisonment.
Over time and under pressure from repeated exposure to
similarly draconian Jean Valjean-esque 2 facts, the Court fractured in
proportionality review cases but largely continued the course of
nonintervention out of deference.83 In Ewing v. California,4 the
Supreme Court split over an Eighth Amendment challenge to a
sentence of twenty-five years to life for shoplifting three golf clubs
under California's three-strike law with the result of affirming the
sentence.8" In Lockyer v. Andrade,8 6 the Court fractured over a
sentence of fifty years to life for shoplifting videotapes, affirming that
sentence, too. 7 Writing for a plurality of three, Justice O'Connor
underscored the need for deference to the legislature and its choice of
penal policies, and stated that outside of the noncapital context, "only
extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime"
would implicate the Eighth Amendment's exceedingly narrow
proportionality principle. 8
In 2003, the same year the Court decided Ewing and Lockyer,
Justice Kennedy gave a memorable speech to the American Bar
80. Id. at 264, 266, 285. Rummel's prior two predicate convictions were fraudulent use
of a credit card to get $80 worth of goods and passing a forged check for $28.36. Id. at 26566.
81. Id. at 272, 274.
82. See VICTOR HUGO, LES MISERABLES 30-32 (Charles Wilbour trans., Halcyon

House 1947) (1862) (telling the story of Jean Valjean, imprisoned for nineteen years for
stealing bread for his starving sister and her children and for escape attempts that
extended his base five-year sentence).
83. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63
(2003); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (rejecting an Eighth
Amendment claim brought against a sentence of life imprisonment for possessing more
than 650 grams of cocaine).
84. 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
85. Id. at 18-19, 30 (plurality opinion).
86. 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
87. Id. at 66, 67. The sentence was two consecutive terms of twenty-five years to life.
Id. at 66.
88. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 23-25 (plurality opinion) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501
U.S. 957, 1001 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Association urging that lawyers do something about the ossification
of severity in American criminal justice to ease the fiscal and human
toll.89 In an oft-quoted diagnosis of the system, Justice Kennedy said,
"Our resources are misspent, our punishments too severe, our
sentences too long." 90 He cautioned about a misallocation of
priorities, noting, "When it costs so much more to incarcerate a
prisoner than to educate a child, we should take special care to ensure
that we are not incarcerating too many persons for too long." 9' In oral
remarks that extemporized to a degree, varying somewhat from the
prepared remarks, and underscoring the heartfelt concern behind the
prepared text, Justice Kennedy said:
The debate on the purposes of prison-should it be deterrence,
should it be prevention, should it be rehabilitation-has gone
on for a long time. But please don't think it's a tired debate.
That debate must be renewed given the number of people we
have in our prisons. We have to find some way to bridge the
gap between skepticism about rehabilitation and the fact that so
many of your fellow citizens and your fellow humans are being
maintained in prison... . There are reasons for incapacitation.
But that simply can't be the sole function of our prisons .... It is

not acceptable for all of our prisoners and for all of our prisons
to borrow a sign from Mr. Dante's Inferno: "Leave aside all
hope all ye who enter here."92
The speech was striking because the Court had just signaled it was
bowing out of noncapital proportionality review because of deference
to the political process.9 3 Justice Kennedy's call to the polity was also
brave, within the constraints of the stance of judicial nonintervention,
because rather than just avert his gaze, Justice Kennedy called for the
political process to do something.
For seven years after Justice Kennedy's call, the Court sat back
and waited for the political process to take action. But the political
process was stuck. The politics of crime and punishment had created a
one-way ratchet because of the skewed incentives to create more
89. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, U.S. Supreme Court, Keynote Address at the
American Bar Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003), available at http://www
.abanow.org/2003108/speech-byjustice-anthony-kennedy-at-aba-annual-meetingl.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, U.S. Supreme Court, Keynote Address at the
American Bar Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003), http://www.c-spanvideo.org
/program/KeynoteAddress7 (providing quoted remarks at time stamps 27:41 to 29:15 and
31:02 to 31:15).
93. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 23-25 (plurality opinion).
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crimes and ramp up penalties to respond to the salient crime story of
the day and because of the risk of looking soft on crime.9 4 More than
a half decade later, the nation was still mired in penal severity and the
pathological politics of crime.
2. Facing the Human Costs
95
the Supreme Court finally sat back no
In Graham v. Florida,
longer. Justice Kennedy wrote for a majority of the Court, a rare
triumph in a noncapital proportionality review case, which typically
produces a jigsaw puzzle of opinions with only the result discernible.
In a heartening turn from the frequent five-to-four split down
ideological lines in controversial cases, there were six votes for
striking down a sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole
for armed burglary and attempted armed robberies committed at ages
sixteen and seventeen.96 Chief Justice Roberts concurred in the
judgment striking down Graham's sentence to life in prison without
parole." The Chief Justice has said "5-4 decisions make it harder for
the public to respect the Court as an impartial institution that
transcends partisan politics."98 His stand in Graham helps counter
that impression.
Graham involved facts that capture the twin trends of severity
drift and giving up on people that mark the prevailing penal
approach.99 The criminal justice system gave up on the young
defendant in the case, Terrance Jamar Graham, after he flunked his
first chance."I Justice Kennedy's opinion in Graham began by
introducing Graham not by his crime as typically occurs in criminal
opinions, 10 1 but by the circumstances of his birth to crack-addicted

94. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
95. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
96. Id. at 2011,2018, 2034, 2036.
97. Id. at 2036-42 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
98. Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts's Rdes, ATLANTA MONTHLY, Jan.-Feb. 2007, at 104, 105.
99. See infra notes 106-22.
100. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2645-46 (2008); Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555 (2005). Roper opens the facts section with this arresting
sentence: "At the age of 17, when he was still a junior in high school, Christopher
Simmons, the respondent here, committed murder." Roper, 543 U.S. at 556. The opinion
proceeds to narrate chilling details of Simmons's cold-blooded commission of the crime.
Id. at 556-58. In Kennedy, Justice Kennedy begins the recitation of the facts thus:
"Petitioner's crime was one that cannot be recounted in these pages in a way sufficient to
capture in full the hurt and horror inflicted on his victim or to convey the revulsion
society, and the jury that represents it, sought to express by sentencing petitioner to
death." Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2646.
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parents.102 The opinion's brief but evocative introduction made clear
that Graham had the chips stacked against him. He suffered from
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and began using addictive
substances early, smoking tobacco at age nine and marijuana at age
thirteen." 3 Studies indicate that prenatal cocaine exposure may
render a child vulnerable to "dysfunction in selective attention"'" and

parental substance abuse heightens the risk that the child will become
a substance abuser.'

The opinion thus began by explaining the

context for Graham's later conduct, recalling an era of sensitivity to
the etiology of crime.
As far as crimes go, Graham's crimes were serious compared to
the shoplifting,0 6 passing a bad check,0 7 or obtaining money under

false pretenses0 8 at issue in some of the Court's earlier noncapital
proportionality cases. At age sixteen, he committed attempted armed
robbery and burglary of a restaurant. 019 Armed burglaries and

robberies are considered crimes of violence because of the high risk
of people getting hurt."0 And people did get hurt during the

commission of Graham's crimes, though he was not the one striking
the blows. 1
For most felonies under Florida law, the prosecutor has
discretion to decide whether to charge sixteen- and seventeen-yearolds as juveniles or adults." 2 The prosecutor opted to charge Graham
102. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2018.
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., Mathew H. Gendle et al., Enduring Effects of PrenatalCocaine Exposure
on Selective Attention and Reactivity to Errors, 118 BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE 290, 296
(2004).
105. See, e.g., Kevin P. Haggerty et al., Long-Term Effects of the Focus on Families
Project on Substance Use Disorders Among Children of Parents in Methadone Treatment,
103 ADDICTION 2008, 2008-09 (2008); Jeannette L. Johnson & Michelle Leff, Children of
Substance Abusers: Overview of Research Findings,103 PEDIATRICS 1085, 1085-86 (1999).
106. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11,11 (2003) (plurality opinion).
107. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 281 (1983).
108. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,266 (1980).
109. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011,2018-19 (2010).
110. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 529 F.3d 1232, 1234, 1237-38 (2008) (holding
that attempted armed robbery is categorically a crime of violence where it includes as an
element the attempted or threatened use of force against another); U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4Bl.2(a) (2010) (designating burglary a crime of violence
because of the serious risk of injury to another involved).
111. Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2018-19. In the restaurant armed robbery, Graham's
accomplice twice whacked the restaurant manager with a metal bar in the back of the
head. Id. at 2018. In the second attempted robbery the same night of the home invasion
armed robbery, Graham's accomplice got shot. Id. at 2019.
112. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.227(1)(b) (West 2003) (subsequently renumbered at
§ 985.557(1)(b) (2007)).
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as an adult, exposing him to a possible life sentence for the charge of
armed burglary with assault or battery. 13 Graham ultimately pled
guilty in exchange for the prosecutor's recommendation for a
sentence of concurrent terms of three years of probation and withheld
adjudication on both charges. 114
The judge sentenced Graham in accordance with the plea
agreement, giving him the bargained-for break of delayed
adjudication and three years of probation. 1 5 The first year of
probation was to be spent in the county jail, but Graham received
credit for time served pending trial and was released.1 16 Less than six
months later, while on parole, Graham joined in an armed home
invasion and another attempted robbery all in one night. 17 Fleeing by
car at high speed, Graham crashed into a telephone pole and then
tried to flee on foot. 1 8
Appearing before a different judge, Graham's defense attorney
tried to lay the case for a second chance." 9 The sentencing judge was
unconvinced and told Graham that he was a hopeless case:
[Y]ou had a judge who took the step to try and give you
direction through his probation order to give you a chance to
get back onto track....
And I don't understand why you would be given such a great
opportunity to do something with your life and why you would
throw it away. The only thing that I can rationalize is that you
decided that this is how you were going to lead your life and
that there is nothing that we can do for you.... We can't do
anything to deter you....
... [I]t is apparent to the Court that you have decided that this
is the way you are going to live your life and that the only thing

113. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 810.02(1)(b), (2)(a) (West 2007); Graham, 130S. Ct. at 2018.
114. See Transcript of Proceedings, Florida v. Graham, No. 2003-11912-CFA (4th Jud.
Cir. Fla. Dec. 18, 2003), in Joint Appendix, Vol. I, at 31, Florida v. Graham, No. 08-7412,
(U.S. July 16, 2009).
115. Seeid.at36.
116. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2018.
117. Id. at 2018-19.
118. Id. at2019.
119. Transcript of Proceedings, Florida v. Graham, No. 16 2003 CF 11912 AXXX MA
(4th Jud. Cir. Fla. Mar. 7, 2006), in Joint Appendix, Vol. I1at 278, Florida v. Graham, No.
08-7412 (U.S. July 16,2009).
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I can do now is to try and protect the community from your
actions. 2 0
The sentencing court's analysis and sentence captures in courtroom
vernacular the dominant penal approach and sentiment of our time:
incapacitation. Graham had flubbed his first and only chance badly.
Accordingly, the court gave up on him.
Graham forfeited his delayed adjudication and the court entered
convictions for the armed burglary and attempted armed robbery
charges that brought him before the court initially. 2' The court
sentenced Graham to life imprisonment for the armed burglary and
fifteen years for the attempted armed robbery.'22 In Florida, life
imprisonment actually meant life imprisonment because parole had
been abolished. 23 At age nineteen, therefore, Graham would have no
second chances and instead be warehoused in jail for all of his
adulthood for crimes committed when he was sixteen and seventeen.
3. A Judicial Nudge out of Incapacitation Stagnation
After cases such as Ewing and Harmelin v. Michigan'2 4 sounded
the de facto death knell for noncapital proportionality review,
Graham's challenge of his noncapital sentence was difficult indeed.
And so was Justice Kennedy's task in distinguishing those deeply
fractured cases in striking down Graham's sentence. Harmelin, for
example, let stand a sentence of life without parole for cocaine
possession.'25 Justice Kennedy distinguished those cases of
individuated sentence review from Graham's categorical challenge to
life imprisonment without parole for juveniles.'2 6 The majority
opinion applied the categorical analysis usually reserved for death
27
penalty cases for the first time in a noncapital case.1
Even applying the lens of categorical proportionality review, the
severity drift over the penal law landscape made the case more
complicated. Thirty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and the
federal system all permitted sentences of life without parole for

120. Id. at 392, 394.

121. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2020.
122. id.
123. Id.
124. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
125. Id. at 961,996.
126. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021-23.
127. See id. at 2046 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that prior to this ruling, the Court
had consistently recognized a special distinction between capital and noncapital sentences
and declaring " 'Death is different' no longer").
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juvenile non-homicide offenders under some circumstances. 128 Justice
Kennedy acknowledged "that in terms of absolute numbers juvenile
life without parole sentences for non-homicides are more common
at issue in some of this Court's other
than the sentencing practices
' 129
Eighth Amendment cases."
Justice Kennedy made important distinctions, however, between
possibility and practice, and between intended, deliberated-overpenal
severity and what arises at the confluence of trends in harshening
sentences. 30 Placing weight on actual practice rather than possibility,
Justice Kennedy noted only eleven jurisdictions had imposed life
without parole on non-homicide juvenile offenders-and even then
rarely.' Twenty-six states and the District of Columbia had not
imposed the penalty despite statutory authorization to do so.132
Importantly, the Court distinguished sentences that were possible
because of the confluence of get-tough measures such as transfer of
juveniles to adult courts from penalties that "legislatures in those
' 133
jurisdictions have deliberately concluded.., would be appropriate."
Justice Kennedy took pains to underscore that statutory eligibility for
life imprisonment without parole did not indicate "the penalty has
been endorsed through deliberate, express, and full legislative
consideration."'34 This analytical move made deliberation important

again in a heated arena where full evaluation of the benefits and costs
of ratcheting up penal severity had dramatically receded.
The other value richly woven into the majority opinion was the
import of hope. Justice Kennedy explained that we are particularly
concerned about imprisoning youthful offenders for life because
"[jiuveniles are more capable of change than are adults, and their
actions are less likely to be evidence of 'irretrievably depraved

character' than are the actions of adults." 13 5 In his earlier decision in
Roper v. Simmons,'3 6 invalidating the death penalty for juveniles,

Justice Kennedy underscored that "a greater possibility exists that a
minor's character deficiencies will be reformed."'37 Now in Graham,
Justice Kennedy referred back to the psychology and neuroscience
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 2023.
Id. at 2025.
Id. at 2023.
Id. at 2024.
Id.
Id. at 2025 (emphasis added).
Id. at 2026 (emphasis added).
Id. (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005)).
543 U.S. 551 (2005).
Id. at 570.
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data offered by amici in Roper showing that juvenile and adult minds
are different, with the behavior-control
part of the brain continuing to
13 8
mature in late adolescence.
Life in prison without possibility of parole was special too,
because of how it snuffed out hope. Justice Kennedy explained that
life imprisonment without possibility of parole, like the death
sentence, was irrevocable, extinguishing "basic liberties without
giving hope of restoration" aside from the remote exception of
executive
clemency. 139
The
sentence
was
a
" 'denial of hope; it means that good behavior and character
improvement are immaterial; it means that whatever the future might
hold in store for the mind and spirit of [the convict], he will remain in
prison for the rest of his days.' "140

Justice Kennedy reiterated that it is the legislature's prerogative
to choose among penological goals.'

But that did not mean the

Court would abdicate scrutiny of the choice of penal purposes, which
are relevant in the Eighth Amendment analysis.' 42 The opinion
explained that the penalty's forswearance of the rehabilitative ideal
was relevant to the disproportionality analysis. 4 3 As for
incapacitation, the prevalent penal approach of our times, the Court
held: "Incapacitation cannot override all other considerations, lest the
Eighth Amendment's rule against disproportionate sentences be a
nullity."'" The Court imposed a categorical rule to give "all juvenile
nonhomicide offenders a chance to demonstrate maturity and
reform"-in other words, to carve out space and incentive for hope
and redemption, at least for juveniles.145
The recurrent motif of hope makes Graham an exemplar of how
doctrine can cultivate and seed appreciation for the power of positive
emotions and hope in the law. Penal law and theory has had a long
and intimate engagement with negative emotions such as anger, fear,

138. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (citing Brief for Am. Med. Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae
at 16-24, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2008) (No. 03-633)); Brief for Am.
Psychological Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae at 22-27, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551
(2008) (No. 03-633).
139. Graham,130 S. Ct. at 2027.
140. Id. (quoting Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 944 (Nev. 1989)).
141. Id. at 2028.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2030.
144. Id. at 2029.
145. Id. at 2032.
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and dread as the levers and subjects of governance. 4 6 The import of
cultivating positive emotions, however, is far less emphasized,
particularly when it comes to positive emotions related to the
147 Graham's
offender, who, after all, is supposed to be punished.
148
attention to the import of hope is a salutary shift.
By making legislative deliberation, hope, and incentive to
demonstrate reform relevant, Graham also represents a nudge out of
incapacitation stagnation. The Court waited patiently after Justice
Kennedy's speech deploring punitive harshness and after constricting
Eighth Amendment noncapital proportionality review almost to the
point of closure out of deference to the political process. The lessons
of experience had been mounting, however. Despite the Court's
patience, the nation was still stuck in a rut, caught in the quagmire of
crime politics. In Graham, the Court finally intervened, while
exercising care not to overstep its institutional role and competence.
Graham supplied a nudge,49by establishing values as salient guideposts
rather than a straitjacket.
It is not the province of courts to set penal policy. It is the task of
courts, however, to make values salient to the polity and to set forth
an analytical framework that provides guidance to lawmakers,
particularly when processual dysfunction leads to legislation that
pushes the gray boundaries of constitutionality. A potent but
unobtrusive way to nudge pathological politics out of a dangerous rut
and implant healthier substantive and processual norms is to make
such values relevant factors in assessing proportionality. Such a
judicial nudge is a way for the Court to keep within its institutional
role of construing law without legislating, in accordance with

146. See Terry A. Maroney, Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging
Field, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 119, 120 (2006) (noting criminal law has long taken
account of emotion by reflecting "theories of fear, grief, and remorse").
147. See Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Law in the Cultivation of Hope, 95 CALIF. L.
REV. 319, 320-21, 378-80 (2007) (illuminating the need to examine the law's role in
harnessing and cultivating positive emotions beyond the work on the use of negative
emotions to shape behavior); cf. JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS
AND MERCY 126-27 (1988) (discussing punishment in the context of pain and suffering).
148. See Barbara L. Fredrickson, The Role of Positive Emotions in Positive Psychology,
56 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 218, 218, 224 (2001) (exploring the role of positive emotions); see
also Leslie S. Greenberg & Jeremy D. Safran, Emotion in Psychotherapy, 44 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 19, 20 (1989) (explaining that experiential and humanistic therapy
conceives of "emotion as an important motivator of change" and "an orientating system
that provides the organism with adaptive information").
149, See supra notes 142-145 and accompanying text (analyzing how Justice Kennedy's
opinion underscores the problems with snuffing out hope and eschewing altogether the
rehabilitative ideal).
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constitutional values, while giving the polity guidance to see the path
out of a political mire. A nudge is also in keeping with our republican
order that relies on the wisdom of select bodies entrusted to see
beyond messy quagmires in which political actors may be stuck.
4. The Utility of Uncertainty
Graham has shaken up and reinvigorated Eighth Amendment
noncapital proportionality review. 5 What Graham portends,
however, is uncertain. Will Graham just stand for the limited notion
that juveniles plus life imprisonment without possibility of parole, like
death, is special too? If so, the decision's reach would be quite
limited-though the impact on those given hope again would be
substantial, of course. There are 129 juvenile offenders serving life
sentences without possibility of parole-seventy-seven of them in
Florida-making the sentence "exceedingly rare." 5 '
The dissenters in Graham certainly thought the majority opinion
stood for more. As Justice Thomas forecast, "[n]o reliable limiting
principle remains to prevent the Court from immunizing any class of
offenders from the law's third, fourth, fifth, or fiftieth most severe
penalties as well."' 5 2 But how much more-and whether the formerly
bifurcated "death is different" proportionality analysis will just get
trifurcated so that life in prison without parole for juveniles is
different too-remains to be seen.
Indeed, having succeeded in delivering a rare majority decision
in a noncapital proportionality case, the Court declined to take on the
tough and even more polarizing case of Joe Harris Sullivan,
sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole for the rape of
a seventy-two-year-old woman at age thirteen.'53 There are only eight
people in the world serving life sentences without parole for crimes
committed when thirteen-and only two among those committed a

150. Cf Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2045 n.1 (Thomas, J.,dissenting) (noting the Court
"radically departs from the framework ... [noncapital proportionality review] precedents
establish by applying to a noncapital sentence the categorical proportionality review its
prior decisions have reserved for death penalty cases alone" and Justice Roberts's
concurrence "breathes new life into the case-by-case proportionality approach ... from
which the Court has steadily... retreated").
151. Adam Liptak, Justices Limit Life Sentences for Juveniles, N.Y. TIMES, May 17,
2010, at Al.
152. Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2046 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
153. See Sullivan v. State, 987 So. 2d 83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (per curiam)
(affirming the sentence), cert. granted, 129 S.Ct. 2157 (2009), cert. dismissed, 130 S.Ct.
2059 (2010) (per curiam); Adam Liptak, Defining 'Cruel and Unusual Punishment' When
the Offender is 13, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2009, at A12 (providing the facts of the case).
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nonhomicide crime. 154 Both of those people, including Sullivan, were
sentenced in Florida, and both are black. 155 The Court initially
granted certiorari, but after Graham, dismissed certiorari as
56
improvidently granted.
The very uncertainty as to Graham's scope may be a gentler way
to nudge officials toward policies and sentences that do not push the
gray area of constitutionality while keeping within the Court's
historically cautious role in checking penal choices. Uncertainty as to
where the constitutional line extends may lead to greater deliberation
informed by the standards and values underscored as guidelines. In
the venerable debate over standards versus rules, Seana Valentine
Shiffrin recently made an important salvo, arguing that the very
vagueness of standards can be a virtue in inducing and developing
moral deliberation and agency among citizens and democratic
education as citizens ask themselves whether their conduct satisfies
the standard.'57 Uncertainty over the broader implications of a
decision that carves out a categorical rule-like prohibition but also
enshrines wider values can have a similar salutary effect in inducing
deliberation. Uncertainty over how far the decision may sweep
induces deliberation over the principles enunciated in the decision
and careful treading when it comes to policies that push into the gray
zone around the uncertain line.
Uncertainty also has the virtue of leaving space for the more
institutionally competent political actors to implement constitutional
values. Lawrence Sager has argued that the Supreme Court may
decline to actively enforce constitutional protections to their full
boundaries because of concerns over institutional competence.'58
There is a dilemma in the under-enforcement theory, however. How
can a right exist if it is not judicially enforced? One way for the Court
to address the problem may be through ambiguity as to the
implications of a judicial intervention and its full ramifications,
instead highlighting general values as guides for future legislative
action. In the face of ambiguity, decision makers exert greater caution
and use the available guideposts, including values made salient by the
154. Liptak, supra note 151.
155. Id.
156. Sullivan v. Florida, 129 S. Ct. 2157 (2009) (granting certiorari), cert. dismissed, 130
S. Ct. 2059 (2010) (per curiam).
157. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation:On the Occasional Virtues
of Fog, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1214,1224-27 (2010).
158. LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 93-95 (2004).
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Court. The Court can then take an incremental, wait-and-see attitude
to see if the political process is self-correcting. In this way, the Court
stays within its institutional competence and role but still influences
the vindication of constitutional values.
B.

Reform by PrisonerRelease Order
1. A Judicial Push When Wait and See Has Not Worked

If Graham represents a judicial nudge out of incapacitation
stagnation, the 184-page decision and order of the three-judge court
in Coleman v. Schwarzenegger s9 that the Supreme Court recently
affirmed in Brown v. Plata6 ° is more of a push. Coleman is the first
decision to order prison population reduction over state objection
absent consent decree since the enactment of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act ("PLRA") of 1995,161 which imposed high hurdles for
prison population reduction orders in part because of a controversial
prisoner reduction consent decree in Philadelphia alleged to have put
dangerous people on the streets to reoffend. 161 The case stems from
two class action lawsuits alleging unconstitutional failure to provide
adequate medical care (the Plata class action) and adequate mental
health care (the Coleman class action). 63
The context of the cases is the "state of emergency" in
California's prisons, packed to 190% of intended capacity,
overwhelming sewer, water, and electrical systems and sparking riots
that put inmates and guards at "extreme peril."'" The state of
emergency in California's prisons is the consequence of fiercely

159. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, Nos. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, C01-1351 TEH,
2009 WL 2430820 (E.D. Cal. & N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009), appeal granted sub nom.,
Schwarzenegger v. Plata, 130 S.Ct. 3413 (2010).
160. 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
161. Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 03-804, 110 Stat. 1321-66,
1321-70 to -75 (1996) (codified in relevant part at 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2006)).
162. See, e.g., Response to Motions to Dismiss or Affirm, Cal. State Republican
Legislator Intervenors v. Plata, 131 S.Ct. 2929 (U.S. 2011) (No. 09-1232), 2010 WL
4494028 at *1 (noting "no similar order has been issued over an objection in the fourteen
year history of the" PLRA). For an account of the controversial Philadelphia consent
decree as stimulus, see, e.g., Norma Levy Shapiro, Reflections on the PhiladelphiaJails
Consent Decree, in CONSENT AND ITS DISCONTENTS: POLICY ISSUES IN CONSENT
DECREES 91-96 (Andrew Rachlin ed., 2006); Anthony Shorris, Preface to CONSENT AND
ITS DISCONTENTS: POLICY ISSUES IN CONSENT DECREES, at i (Andrew Rachlin ed.,
2006).
163. Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820, at *10, *22.
164. See Jennifer Warren, State Prison Crowding Emergency Declared, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 5, 2006, at Al (reporting on the emergency declaration).
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tough-on-crime policies resulting in California spending "more on
corrections than most countries in the world" but with "fewer public
safety benefits."' 65 California pays more for prisons than higher
education, shelling out $8 billion a year to sustain its high rate of
incarceration.' 66 In a time of prolonged fiscal crisis, the state has fallen
far behind in providing for the 750% surge in prisoners since the
1970s.

67

The state, mired in steep recession, cannot afford to build

enough prisons to keep pace with its rate of incarceration.'68
Every day, large, fresh flows of prisoners are packed into
overburdened criminogenic conditions where officials lack the
resources to engage in effective sorting. Thus, a nonviolent person
may be crowded in close conditions with high-risk, hardened violent
offenders and forced to find ways to survive in brutalizing
conditions.'69 The overcrowding crisis is graphically captured in
photos posted on the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation website depicting prisoners crowded into "bad
beds"-vast rows of double or triple bunks crammed into areas never
intended to house prisoners such as gyms, classrooms, dayrooms, and
other spaces formerly used for rehabilitative efforts.170 A single toilet
may be shared by as many as 54 prisoners, and as many as 200
prisoners may be packed into a gym.171
Conditions are so severe that, as the fact-finding Plata court
reported, "it is an uncontested fact that, on average, an inmate in one
of California's prisons needlessly dies every six to seven days due to
constitutional deficiencies."' I 2 I11 prisoners wait months and may die
165. LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 72, at 14.
166. See Randal C. Archibold, Driven to a FiscalBrink, a State Throws Open the Doors
to Its Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2010, at A14. California spends nearly 11% of its
general budget on prisons, compared to 7.5% on higher education. Jennifer Steinhauer,
Schwarzenegger Seeks Shift from Prisonsto Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2010, at A21.
167. Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820, at *19.
168. Jack Dolan, Lawmakers Express Frustration over Excessive Outlays for Prison
Health, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2011, at Al; Dashka Slater & Gary Rivlin, California on the
Brink, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 5,2011, at 26.
169. See Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820, at *40, *85-86 (noting that the prisoner
classification system has broken down because of overcrowding and a quarter of prisoners
are housed outside their classification levels rendering conditions criminogenic).
170. Warren, supra note 164 (describing state of emergency and "bad beds"); Cal.
Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., Prison Overcrowding Images, FLICKR, http://www.flickr.com
/photos/37381942@N04/sets/72157626788363216/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2012) (providing
forty photos).
171. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1924 (2011).
172. Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351, 2005 WL 2932253, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3,
2005). For discussion of later data from 2006 and 2007, see Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910,
1925 n.4 (2011).
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or commit suicide while waiting for treatment.'73 For lack of mental
health facility beds, mentally ill prisoners are held in de facto
segregation for as much as six months or more, sometimes held in
phone booth-sized cages. 17 4 Graphic and gut-wrenching accounts
abound: an inmate was found nearly catatonic after being stored for
almost twenty-four hours in a phone booth-sized cage standing in his
own urine; prisoners suffering from excruciating abdominal or chest
pain died while waiting hours or even weeks for treatment.'75 Suicide
rates are nearly eighty percent higher in California's prisons than the
national average in prisons.176 According to the Special Master
appointed to oversee the delivery of mental healthcare,
72.1% of the
177
suicides were either foreseeable, preventable, or both.
Prisons lack even the bare minimum space to deliver adequate
care. For example, medical "exams" are conducted in scraps of space
too small for an actual physical exam.'78 The yearly influx of
approximately 140,000 inmates also has overwhelmed the capacity of
"reception centers," two of which are at 300% of design capacity,
meaning newcomers have languished for long periods without even
preliminary screening for medical and mental health needs. 17 9 Even
when identified as being in need of treatment, severe staffing
shortages and the dearth of space means that prisoners do not get
adequate medical care in a timely fashion and mentally ill patients
may wait months for a place in an appropriate facility to open up. 180
After finding Eighth Amendment violations, the district courts
for the Eastern and Northern Districts of California have struggled
for years with the noncompliance of prison mental and medical care
with constitutional requirements. 8 ' The Supreme Court has read the
Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment to require the government "to provide medical care for
those whom it is punishing by incarceration."' 182 The Eighth
Amendment tolerates substantial overcrowding and prisoner-packing
improvisations when prisons exceed design capacity such as "double
173. See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1933 (recounting prisoners' experiences).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1924-25.
176. Id. at 1924.
177. Id. at 1924-25.
178. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, Nos. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, C01-1351 TEH,
2009 WL 2430820, at *36 (E.D. Cal. & N.D. Cal. Aug. 4,2009).
179. Id. at *35.
180. Id. at *38.
181. Id. at *12.
182. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
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ceiling" but there may not be "deprivations of essential food, medical
care, or sanitation." '83 "[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical
needs" amounts to a constitutional violation. 1" Applying these
constitutional standards to the Coleman class action alleging
constitutionally inadequate healthcare, the district court appointed a
special master in 1995 to remedy the violations.'85 In the Plata class
action, the parties entered into a stipulation for injunctive relief in
2002 amounting to a comprehensive overhaul of the prison medical
system with stipulated policies and procedures spanning
18 6
approximately 800 pages.
Three years after the stipulation in Plata, the district court found,
based on a six-day evidentiary hearing, that it was "beyond
reasonable dispute" that California had failed to provide the
stipulated relief to bring medical care to constitutionally required
minimum standards.' 87 Concluding "the California prison medical
care system is broken beyond repair," the district court put the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation medical
system under federal receivership. 8 The Federal Receiver was given
the task of "executive management of the California prison medical
health care delivery system with the goals of restructuring day-to-day
operations and developing, implementing, and validating a new,
sustainable system that provides constitutionally adequate medical
care" to prison inmates.' 89
In both the Coleman and Plata class actions, the judicial
appointment of an adjunct overseer proved insufficient because
severe overcrowding impeded attempts to bring medical and mental
healthcare to minimum constitutional requisites. 9 ° In 2007, the
district courts jointly considered motions by the plaintiffs in both class
actions for the convening of a three-judge court to issue more drastic
orders to address overcrowding that could constitute "prisoner
release orders" subject to heightened standards and procedures under

183. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,348 (1981).
184. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.
185. See Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1323-24 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (adopting
magistrate judge's finding of constitutional violations with modifications and ordering the
appointment of a special master to remedy constitutional violations).
186. See Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820, at *3-5 (giving the procedural history).
187. Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351, 2005 WL 2932253, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3,
2005).
188. Id.
189. Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820, at *11 (internal citations omitted).
190. Id.
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the PLRA.19' The PLRA defines potential "prisoner release order[s]"
broadly to include "any order, including a temporary restraining
order or preliminary injunctive relief, that has the purpose or effect of
reducing or limiting the prison population, or that directs the release
from or non-admission of prisoners to a prison. '192 The Act forbids
courts from entering such orders unless:
(i) a court has previously entered an order for less intrusive
relief that has failed to remedy the deprivation of the Federal
right sought to be remedied through the prisoner release order;
and (ii) the defendant has had a reasonable amount of time to
comply with the previous court orders. 193
As a further hurdle, prisoner release orders must be issued by a threejudge court based on a finding "by clear and convincing evidence
that-(i) crowding is the primary cause of the violation of a Federal
right; and (ii) no other relief will remedy the violation of the Federal
right."1' 94
The district courts ordered the convening of a three-judge court
to consider whether to issue prisoner release orders. 195 Among the
judges appointed to the panel was Judge Stephen Reinhardt, the
liberal lion of the Ninth Circuit who, as Judith Resnik recently put it,
"is one of the high-visibility judges whose majority opinions are also
seen as attracting the Court's attention."' 9 6 In a move revelatory of
the crisis and dangers posed by the overcrowding crisis, the California
Correctional Peace Officers Association intervened to join the
prisoners they guarded in asking for a prisoner reduction order
because of the harmful consequences of overcrowding to the safety of
staff as well as inmates. 197
The three-judge panel issued a detailed lengthy opinion finding
that prison overcrowding was a "primary cause" of the constitutional
deficiencies in medical and mental healthcare and no other remedies
would address the problem as demonstrated by the failure of less

191. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(A)(i) (2006).
192. Id. § 3626(g)(4).
193. Id. § 3626(a)(3)(A).
194. Id. § 3626(a)(3)(E).
195. Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351, 2005 WL 2122657, at *3-6 (N.D. Cal. July
23, 2007).
196. Judith Resnik, Reading Reinhardt: The Work of Constructing Legal Virtue
(Exempla Iustitiae), 120 YALE L.J. 539, 555 (2010).
197. See, e.g., Plaintiff Intervenor Cal. Corr. Peace Officers' Ass'n Proposed Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 2, Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, Nos. CIV CIV S90-0520
LKK JFM P, CIV C01-1351 TEH (E.D. Cal. & N.D. Cal. 2009).
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intrusive approaches over a prolonged period of time.1 98 The court
further found that rather than improving safety, prison had become
"criminogenic," posing a threat to public safety by sending 123,000
prisoners each year back into society who were "often more
dangerous than" before incarceration.199 In the teeming prison
pressure cooker, high-risk inmates cannot possibly rehabilitate and
low-risk inmates, who are too often mixed in with the dangerous
because of overburdened staff and resources, learn more dangerous
behavior.2 °0
Before entering a prisoner release order, a three-judge court
must demonstrate it has given "substantial weight to any adverse
impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system
caused by the relief. ' 21 The three-judge court held that prisoner
reduction could be ordered without compromising safety through
such measures as expanding early release and good time credits for
low- to moderate-risk inmates; implementing alternatives to
incarceration for low-risk offenders with short sentences and
and
employing evidence-based
technical parole violators;
rehabilitative programs to lower the likelihood of reoffending. 2°2 The
three-judge court ordered California to reduce its prison population
from 190% of capacity to 137.5% of design capacity within two years,
necessitating the release of between 38,000 and 46,000 prisoners.2 3
2. Demonstrating that Deference Does Not Mean Abdication
Shortly after the three-judge court issued the prisoner release
order and refused to stay execution of the order, the Supreme Court
granted appeal.2 °" While the tenor of questioning at oral argument
does not always predict the ending lineup, particularly in the
frequently fractured Eighth Amendment context, the oral argument
in Brown v. Plata proved to offer insights into the outcome.
The Justices' questions indicated that Justice Kennedy would be
pivotal in determining a four to four split in views. Comments by
198. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, Nos. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, CO1-1351 TEH,
2009 WL 2430820, at *33, *64 (E.D. Cal. & N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009).

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at *86, *87 (internal citation omitted).
Id. at *86.
18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2006).
Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820, at *87-105.
Id. at *84, *115; see also Order To Reduce Prison Population, Nos. CIV S-90-0520

LKK JFM P, C01-1351 TEH, 2010 WL 99000, at *3 (E.D. Cal. & N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2010)

(ordering the release of prisoners), appeal granted sub nom., Schwarzenegger v. Plata, 130
S. Ct. 3413, 3413 (2010) (deferring jurisdictional issues to a hearing on the merits).
204. Schwarzenegger v. Plata, 130 S. Ct. 3413, 3413 (2010).
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Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan underscored the
State's failure, despite two decades of judicial waiting, to cure what
Justice Breyer called "a big human rights problem."2 5 The four
justices underscored the findings of the courts below that the root
cause of overcrowding needed to be addressed as a precondition to
any progress on remedying the constitutional infirmities in provision
of healthcare.2" 6
Justice Scalia's questions suggested he was concerned that the
three-judge court did not consider evidence as to whether
unconstitutional conditions had been ameliorated between the
evidentiary trial in August 2008 and the issuance of the prisoner
release order a year later in August 2009.207 Justice Roberts's
questioning also suggested a view that the order was judicial
overreaching because some progress had been made."0 In the interim,
the State neared a deal on building two new medical facilities to
redress the prison healthcare problem. 20 9 Ten months after the three-

205. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Schwarzenegger v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910
(2011) (No. 09-1233) [hereinafter Transcript] (statement of Breyer, J.) (describing crisis
and delay as a "big human rights problem"); id. at 4 (statement of Ginsburg, J.) (noting
"there were something like 70 orders from the district judge" and stating, "[H]ow much
longer do we have to wait? Another 20 years?"); id. at 5 (statement of Sotomayor, J.) ("I
don't see how you wait for an option that doesn't exist."); id. at 29 (statement of Kagan, J.)
(giving weight to "judges who have been involved in these cases since the beginning, for 20
years in the Platacase, who thought: we've done everything we can").
206. See id. at 7 (statement of Ginsburg, J.) (noting "the receiver has said, the special
master has said, we can't make any progress at all until there are fewer people"); id. at 9
(statement of Breyer, J.) (stating "it sounds as if overcrowding is a big, big cause of this
problem, which is horrendous"); id. at 5 (statement of Sotomayor, J.) ("[T]he receiver has
basically said, I've tried, and the small progress we've made has been reversed because the
population keeps growing."); id. at 30 (statement of Kagan, J.) (giving weight to lower
court findings that attempted solutions "won't go anywhere until we can address this root
cause of the problem").
207. Id. at 38-39 (statement of Scalia, J.) (noting that the three-judge court "didn't take
any evidence" as to whether unconstitutional deficiencies due to overcrowding continued
to exist). Justice Scalia may also be swayed by a public safety argument. See id. at 54
(responding to the claim that early release for good time could accomplish prisoner
reduction safely by saying, "[D]oesn't good time credits let-let out people who otherwise
would not be out?").
208. See id. at 41 (statement of Roberts, C.J.) (noting that the intervenors had stated
that the prison population had been reduced by 14,832 between 2006 and 2010).
209. See Michael Rothfield & Eric Bailey, Principals Agree To Scale Back Inmate
Healthcare, L.A. TIMES, May 29, 2009, at A10 (noting deal was near for $2 billion
construction plan, but it was unclear whether state legislators would authorize borrowing
for the plan).
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judge court's prisoner release order, California broke new ground on
a new $906 million prison medical facility, expected to open in 2013.1 °
Justice Alito strongly suggested that the order was overbroadtackling prison overcrowding rather than merely mental and
healthcare-and that the order was defective because it insufficiently

accounted for public safety consequences."

As is generally his

custom, Justice Thomas did not ask questions during oral argument,

but he had earlier expressed the view, in a dissent joined by Justice
Scalia, that historically the Eighth Amendment was not conceived "as

protecting inmates from harsh treatment" and "courts had no role in
regulating prison life" because the Eighth Amendment is not "a
National Code of Prison Regulation."2 1
That left Justice Kennedy, who seemed to agree with the need
for the strong remedy of reduction because of the failure of less
aggressive measures and the political branches to abate the violation.
He told Carter Phillips, counsel for California, "at some point the
court has to say: You've been given enough time; the constitutional
violation still persists." '13 His questions suggested that he was
deliberating over whether the reduction should be slightly smaller
than ordered by the district court, to 145% of capacity rather than
137.5% of capacity, and accomplished in a slightly longer time
horizon of three years rather than two.2 14 Most importantly, however,
Justice Kennedy seemed in Plata, as in Graham, to be willing to

intervene when the prolonged wait-and-see approach had not worked
210. Scott Smith, Officials Break Ground on State Prison Project, CONTRA COSTA
TIMES (Cal.), Nov. 10, 2010, at All, available at 2010 WLNR 23814850.
211. Transcript, supra note 205, at 41 (statement of Roberts, C.J.) (noting that the
intervenors stated the prison population had been reduced by 14,832 between 2006 and
2010); id. at 44, 47 (statement of Alito, J.) ("But why order the release of around 40,000
prisoners, many of whom, perhaps the great majority of whom, are not going to be within
a class in either of these lawsuits? Why order the release of all those people, rather than
ordering the provision of the construction of facilities for medical care, facilities to treat
mental illness, hiring of staff to treat mental illness? Why not go directly to the problem
rather than address what seems to be a different issue altogether? ...If-if I were a
citizen of California, I would be concerned about the release of 40,000 prisoners.").
212. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 19-20, 28 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also, e.g.,
Linda Greenhouse, Clarence Thomas, Silent But Sure, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR BLOG
(Mar. 11, 2010, 9:37 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/11/clarencethomas-silent-but-sure/ (noting Justice Thomas's general custom of silence and consistent
Eighth Amendment stance).
213. Transcript, supra note 205, at 16 (statement of Kennedy, J.).
214. See id. at 75 (statement of Kennedy, J.); see also id. at 59 (statement of Kennedy,
J.) ("There was substantial expert opinion that 145-145 percent would be sufficient. ...
[D]oesn't the evidence indicate to you that at least 145 ought to be the beginning point,
not 137.5?").
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to ensure that deference would not become abdication of the judicial
role.
Ultimately, Justice Kennedy continued his pivotal role in the
revival of the Eighth Amendment to redress the human toll of
incapacitation stagnation. Justice Kennedy authored the decision for
the Court upholding the prisoner release order in Brown."5 His
opinion was exquisitely attuned to the everyday miseries of people
crammed beyond capacity, evocatively describing such cruelties as
needless deaths after hours or weeks of excruciating pain waiting for
treatment, phone booth-sized cages for storing prisoners waiting for
treatment, and a prisoner assaulted in a teeming gym turned human16
warehouse whose dead body was not discovered for several hours.1
The opinion was made all the more powerful by the inclusion of
photos of the cages and of humans crammed into spaces never meant
to hold so many bodies.217
Justice Kennedy reminded a nation whose prisons had veered
from the values of a civilized society-not by intent, perhaps, but
nonetheless in result-that "[p]risoners retain the essence of human
dignity inherent in all persons" and the Eighth Amendment reflects
that principle.218 Justice Kennedy explained that deference to the
states and prison administrators could not mean abdication of the
judicial check; "[i]f government fails to fulfill this obligation, the
courts have a responsibility
to remedy the resulting Eighth
219
Amendment violation.,
Between the majority and the dissenters, a striking battle of
imagery as well as differing visions of institutional roles unfolded.
Justice Scalia's dissent deplored structural reform injunctions in
general and in particular the prisoner release order, which he termed
"perhaps the most radical injunction issued by a court in our Nation's
history. ' 22° He wrote that the injunction "ignore[d] bedrock
limitations on the power of Article III judges, and takes federal courts
wildly beyond their institutional capacity."' As a counterpart to the
powerful imagery of human suffering throughout Justice Kennedy's
opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia retorted that only a tiny fraction
of the plaintiff prisoners might actually individually suffer a torturous,
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1921 (2011).
Id. at 1924-26, 1934.
Id. at 1949-50.
Id. at 1928.
Id.
Id. at 1950 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1950-51.
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lingering death, while many beneficiaries of the prisoner release order
"will undoubtedly be fine physical specimens who have developed
222
intimidating muscles pumping iron in the prison gym.
Justice Kennedy repeatedly underscored for the majority that the
prisoner release order did not dictate the means by which
unconstitutional conditions would be relieved. 223 Like the three-judge
court, Justice Kennedy gave the political branches suggestionsnudges rather than mandates-on how to meet the order in a manner
protective of public safety such as "good-time credits and diverting of
low-risk offenders and technical parole violators to community-based
programs, that will mitigate the order's impact. 2 2 4 Justice Scalia
mocked these suggestions as judicial policy judgments about penology
and recidivism masquerading as factual findings regarding how to
mitigate the adverse impact on public safety.225 Justice Scalia
deplored that the "incompetent policy preferences" of a few judges
226
would "now govern the operation of California's penal system.
The ominous specter intensifying the fierce debate was fear that
the courts' decisions would endanger the public. In another salvo in
the battle of imagery, Justice Alito wrote in a dissent joined by Chief
Justice Roberts that "[t]he three-judge court ordered the premature
release of approximately 46,000 criminals-the equivalent of three
Army divisions. '227 Justice Alito concluded starkly: "I fear that
today's decision, like prior prisoner release orders, will lead to a grim
roster of victims. I hope that I am wrong. In a few years, we will
' 22 8

see."

Trying to mitigate public safety concerns, Justice Kennedy
suggested that the three-judge panel "consider whether it is
appropriate to order the State to begin without delay to develop a
system to identify prisoners who are unlikely to reoffend or who
might otherwise be candidates for early release. '229 He also suggested
to the State that it may wish to ask for an extension of time from the
two years after entry of the order to five years.23 °

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id. at 1953.
Id. at 1943 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at 1954 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1955.
Id. at 1959 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1968.
Id. at 1947 (majority opinion).
Id.
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Time is a crucial part of the force of the remedy. At stake is
whether California can continue in painful fashion in the
incapacitation rut or if the courts' remedial decision will jolt it out.
The three-judge panel's remedy of large-scale reduction in a short
time would push the state to revive or expand measures of mercy such
as good-time credits, diversion of low-risk offenders with short
sentences and technical violators, and other sentencing reforms to
meet the deadline. As Justice Kennedy noted, it is "all but certain
that the State cannot complete sufficient construction to comply fully
with the order" and thus "the prison population will have to be
reduced to at least some extent" through options, including those
rehabilitative measures suggested by the courts.231 In contrast, a
longer time horizon would potentially give the state the opportunity
to drag out the problem while attempting to muster funds to build
new facilities and shuttle prisoners out of state to contract prisons. 232
Realistically, delay does not mean substantial progress on reformjust more prolonged pain in a state forced to cut billions in basic
services such as welfare, medical care for the poor and education to
redress a $26 billion deficit.233 By retaining the timeline-albeit with
indications that California may move for a limited extension-the
Court nudged the state toward sustainable change while balancing the
need for time to devise orderly, considered reforms to mitigate safety
concerns.

III. THE LEGISLATIVE EMERGENCY
The judicial awakening and dialogue are well-timed because the
shifting political context of criminal justice reform renders a search
for more sustainable solutions potentially palatable as well as
pressing. California is hardly the only state experiencing penal law
and policy in a state of profound flux and distress at a time of inability
to pay for incapacitation. Across the nation, at least forty-two states
and the District of Columbia are wrestling with how to fix budget

231. Id. at 1928.
232. See, e.g., Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, Nos. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, C01-1351
TEH, 2009 WL 2430820, at *71 (E.D. Cal. & N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009) (noting California's
proposed alternative of transferring California inmates out of state and potential
deleterious consequences of such action including removing prisoners far from the
rehabilitative influence of family); Transcript, supra note 205, at 7-9 (statement of Carter
J. Phillips, counsel for California) (noting prison construction efforts and arguing
California should have more time to implement such measures).
233. Shane Goldmacher & Patrick McGreevy, Billions in Cuts to Services OKd, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 17, 2011, at Al.
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deficits that total around $103 billion.2 3 States with large budget
shortfalls have resorted to desperate measures, with Arizona, for
example, even recently selling its state capitol building and prisons
and then leasing them back to raise short-term revenue. 235 The
prolonged recession and widespread budget crises are forcing a
confrontation with the high costs of maintaining the world's highest
per capita incarceration rate and a search for alternatives--or, at a
minimum, release valves for the unbearable pressure.
The response has been varied.236 Some of the most prevalent
types of responses sweeping the states are release-valve reforms using
back-end sentence reductions to ease some of the pressure through
the early release of prisoners.237 This trend has led to the revival and
expansion of early release measures that had been curtailed or
eliminated in many states during the severity ramp-up and decline of
the rehabilitative ideal.238 At the same time, however, some states
have made deep cuts to already curtailed programs of rehabilitation
and supervision to ensure successful community reintegration. 23 9 This
Part examines these prevalent trends and how pressure-valve releasedriven practice without orienting penal theory poses risks of danger
to public safety and backlash.
A.

Release-Valve Reforms

The fierce politics surrounding crime and punishment do not
make penal reform easy. Strategies to ease the pressures of paying for
prison while avoiding politically hot-button reforms range from the
comical to the pathological. Wisconsin and Minnesota, for example,
have pursued the course of "tiny, not-so-sexy" nips, instituting "Taco
Tuesday,"-synchronizing meals across prisons-which apparently
yields a cost savings of $2 million per year by saving ten cents per
234. McNiCHOL ET AL., supra note 68, at 6; see also Jack Chang, Brown's Countdown,
Day 7: California Not Alone in Tackling Huge Budget Gaps, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 16,
2011, 2011 WLNR 938094 (reporting that all but ten states are wrestling with a total of
$140 billion in budgetary shortfalls).
235. Nicholas Riccardi, States Still Facing Tough Questions About Budgets, BALT. SUN,

Dec. 8, 2010, at 10A, available at 2010 WLNR 24409988.
236. For examples of states pioneering some salutary shifts toward evidence-based
rehabilitative efforts to reduce recidivism and prison inflow rates and to find sustainable
alternatives to incarceration, see infra Part IV.A-B.
237. See Davey, supranote 1 (describing wave of early release measures).
238. See Joan Petersilia, Parole and PrisonerRe-Entry into the United States, 26 CRIME
& JUST. 479, 479-80, 494-96 (1999) (describing the rollback); Jon Wool & Don Stemen,
Changing Fortunes or Changing Attitudes?: Sentencing and Corrections Reforms in 2003,
16 FED. SENT'G REP. 294, 297-300 (2004) (surveying potential shift and revival).

239. See infra Part III.B.2.
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meal.24 On the pathological end, California planned to address its
massive budget deficit by cutting $811 million from prison medical
care even after the extensive findings of the Coleman three-judge
court about the unconstitutionally poor and dangerous state of affairs
in prison healthcare.241
In search of viable ways to cut more as budget crises have
deepened, states have deployed a wave of "back-end" sentence
reductions to find short-term relief from the fiscal pressures of an2
24
incarceration society by shaving off a little time on some sentences.
About half of the states have adjusted early release and parole
programs and sentencing laws or have plans to do so. 2 43 The broadbased, shallow nature of the cuts means that each individual prisoner
realizes very little in terms of sentence reduction but the aggregate
cuts give the short-term fiscal relief that legislators need when a fiscal
crisis arises during a legislative budget cycle. 2" Because no criminal
penalties are officially reduced and each individual prisoner is
released a seemingly trivial amount of time earlier, back-end
reductions help legislators release some budgetary pressure with a
lessened risk of incurring the charge that they are "soft on crime" or
"go easy" on certain kinds of crimes. Back-end sentence-mitigating
measures are therefore making a comeback, not necessarily because
penal law and policy are embracing the old principles of incentives for
rehabilitation and mercy where warranted,2 45 but rather as a result of
political utility and budgetary pressure release without a commitment
to any particular penal theory.

240. Jason Stein, 'Taco Tuesdays' Part of Plan to Save State Millions, Wis. ST. J., Jan.
10, 2010, at Dl, available at 2010 WLNR 678453.
241. Shane Goldmacher, State's First2010 Budget Cuts Advance, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11,
2010, at AA4.
242. For a collection of recent measures across the states to relieve fiscal year 2011
budget pressures, see, e.g., NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE MEASURES
To CLOSE BUDGET GAPS (2011), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/budget-tax/statemeasures-to-close-budget-gaps.aspx (click "criminal justice" and choose fiscal year to
generate list of recent reforms). For a history of earlier pressure-easing budget reforms
during the post-September 11, 2001 downturn, see, e.g., RYAN S. KING & MARC MAUER,
THE SENTENCING PROJECT, STATE SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS POLICY IN AN ERA

OF FISCAL RESTRAINT 4-8 (2002), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org//doc

/publications/inc statesentencingpolicy/pdf (listing reforms).
243. Davey, supra note 1.
244. See Elizabeth Napier Dewar, Comment, The Inadequacy of Fiscal Constraintsas a
Substitutefor ProportionalityReview, 114 YALE L.J. 1177, 1182 (2005).
245. See, e.g., Nora V. Demleitner, Good Conduct Time: How Much and for Whom?
The Unprincipled Approach of the Model Penal Code: Sentencing, 61 FLA. L. REV. 777,
779, 782 (2009) (explaining that good-time credits provide incentives to rehabilitate).
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Budgetary pressures are the common and prevalent justification
for the sentence reduction and early release measures.24 6 Citing
budgetary pressures makes reforms more politically palatable,
changing the social meaning of reforms from being soft on prisoners
to responding to severe budget crises. Because of severe budgetary
constraints, legislators can say they are enacting early release and
sentence reform measures because fiscal crises are forcing them to
pursue such measures.247 Connecticut legislator Mike Lawlor, for
example, capitalized on the meaning shift occasioned by the budget
crisis to champion rehabilitative alternatives to prison and prison
population reductions, stating "People have to be willing to explain it
and get beyond the usual sort of philosophical battles-tough on
crime, soft on crime. This is just sort of a fiscal reality not a
' 248
philosophical choice.
Examples of expanded early release programs and powers are
myriad. In 2008, Pennsylvania passed the Recidivism Risk Reduction
Act,249 which allows for a reduction of up to a quarter of the sentence
of a nonviolent offender as an incentive to attend rehabilitative
programs and in an effort to save $71.5 million in five years. 210 At the
time, severe overcrowding was forcing the state to construct four new
prisons at $200 million each.251 "[I]n a sea change from politically
popular tough-on-crime calls that have dominated the statehouse
since the 1980s," the sentence-reducing reforms had "widespread
backing: from the Department of Corrections and the Board of
Probation and Parole, to district attorneys, 'state
troopers and police
252
officers, to the Pennsylvania Prison Society.
In April 2009, New York amended its Correction Law to give
counties the authority to establish "local conditional release

246. State Budget Cuts May Lead to Inmate Releases, MSNBC (Apr. 3, 2008, 1:34 PM),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23939378/ns/us-news-crime-and-courts/
(quoting state
officials as defending proposals because of the need to respond to budgetary emergencies
and lack of money for expanding prisons). Some lawmakers and corrections officials,
however, such as Michigan Department of Corrections Director Patricia L. Caruso, say
their main motivation is to reform a broken system. Davey, supra note 1 (quoting Caruso's
view).
247. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 94757 (1996) (describing how the compulsion of law can change the social meaning of conduct
and render behavior once socially infeasible possible).
248. Cadue, supra note 1.
249. 61 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 4504-4506 (West 2008).

250. Id.; Riley Yates, Release Plan for Convicts Starts Slow, PIrrSBURGH POSTSept. 26, 2010, at A14, available at 2010 WLNR 19119656.
251. Yates, supranote 250.
252. Id.
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commissions" to review applicants for early release and relieve the
burdens on county jail." 3 In August 2009, Colorado officials launched
early release initiatives intended to save the state $19 million and to
help fill a $318 million budgetary shortfall.254 In September 2009,
former Illinois Department of Corrections Director Michael Randle
implemented an ultimately short-lived reform dubbed "the
Meritorious Good Time ("MGT")-Push" that allowed prisoners to
start accumulating "good time" credit for early release upon entry
into jail rather than waiting until the prisoner serves sixty days in state
255
prison to shorten the time for eligibility.
Trying to save money by shortening jail time to help address a
$1.3 billion budget deficit, Kentucky passed a provision in its 20092010 budget bill that gives credit for time spent on parole before
technical

parole

violations

return

individuals to

prison. 56 In

Michigan, former Governor Jennifer Granholm commuted 133
sentences and expanded the state's parole board to hear more parole
cases and speed up the early release process. 257 To save the prison

system about $130 million in fiscal year 2011, Granholm also
proposed the reinstatement of good-time credits toward early release,
a policy the state phased out between 1978 and 1998 during the gettough era.2

The budget crisis is also prompting proposals for bolder and
larger reductions in sentences and faster earlier release than the

253. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 270-273 (Consol. 2009) (conferring powers, defining
standards, and establishing procedures); see also, e.g., Denise A. Raymo, Early Release
Option Raised, PRESS-REPUBLICAN (N.Y.), Feb. 19, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR
3325215 (detailing a county's exploration of whether to exercise the power to relieve
overcrowding in county jail).
254. Kirk Mitchell, The Faces of Early Parole: First Ten Felons Set Free in a State Plan
To Save Millions Have Records of Assault, Escape and Rioting, DENV. POST, Oct. 15, 2009,
at Al, available at http://www.denverpost.com/ci_13564285.
255. See MALCOLM C. YOUNG, SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT: THE TRUTH
ABOUT "EARLY RELEASE" FROM ILLINOIS PRISONS 3-5 (2010) (giving the details of the

history of reform); Andy Grimm, Inmates Surge to Record High, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 23,
2010, at 4 (giving a brief history). For a discussion of the denouement of the program, see
infra Part IV.B.
256. Stephenie Steitzer, Ky. Supreme Court Rules Early Releases Proper, COURIER-J.
(Ky.), Nov. 26, 2009, at Al, available at 2009 WLNR 24094014 (describing the jail-timereducing proposal that passed); State Budget Cuts May Lead to Inmate Releases, supra
note 246 (explaining that Kentucky's legislation will save the state $50 million).
257. Davey, supra note 1.
258. Dawson Bell, Plan for Early Release in Granholm's Budget To Face Steep
Opposition, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Feb. 16,2010), http://www.wzzml3.com/news/story
.aspx?storyid=118547. The move carried political consequences, however. For a
discussion, see infra Part IV.B.
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shallow-cut approach taken in less severe and prolonged economic
downturns. Mississippi, for example, amended its law requiring a
prisoner to serve 85% of his sentence before becoming eligible for
early release to give the Parole Board discretion to release an inmate
after service of 25% of the sentence.259 Mississippi also passed a law
permitting "drug offenders to be placed on house arrest at a possible
savings of about $5 million" to the state. 2" Washington is considering
enacting a 50% time-off credit for good behavior for the lowest-risk
categories of prisoners to help lighten the prisoner load.26 1
Some states are also considering "medical parole"-letting out
the sickest inmates to save on healthcare costs. California recently
enacted a bill allowing the release of comatose and physically
incapacitated inmates.26 2 Facing a budget shortfall, Texas is also
debating proposals to release and deport ill, nonviolent, foreign-born
inmates for an estimated $54 million a year in savings.263
Couching early release for the expensively ill as budget-saving
measures changes the meaning of such reforms and makes it more
politically palatable. In contrast, "compassionate release" for the
elderly and generally infirm does not sell as well because it is couched
as a measure of mercy and risks being perceived as "soft" on the
criminal, as demonstrated by the fierce opposition in California to
''compassionate-release" legislation allowing early release of elderly
prisoners who do not pose a public safety risk."6 Opponents of early
release for the elderly have successfully blocked legislation in other

259. Jimmie E. Gates, Inmates Get Early Release, CLARION-LEDGER (Miss.), Nov. 29,
2009, 2009 WLNR 24110992.
260. Id.
261. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.728(1)(b) (West 2010); see also Josh Farley,
Will the State Bring Back Half-Off Sentences for Good Behavior?, KITSAP SUN (Wash.)
(Oct. 9, 2010), http://www.kitsapsun.com/news/2010/oct/09/will-the-state-bring-back-halfoff-sentences-for/ (discussing budgetary impetus for legislation).
262. See Jack Dolan, State Prison Health Costs Under Fire, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2011,
at AA1 (noting that the current bill is unlikely to significantly affect healthcare costs for
California). The Federal Receiver overseeing the prisons argued the program should be
expanded to apply to more than just "people who are literally hooked up to machines, in
comas, that sort of thing" in order to cut costs by 30%. Id.
263. Mike Ward, Texas May Free Some Inmates To Save Money, HOuS. CHRON., Feb.
17, 2011, at B3.
264. See, e.g., Michael Vitiello, Op-Ed., Courts Have Forced State's Hand on Prison
Crowding, SACRAMENTO BEE (Dec. 5,2010), http://www.ongo.com/v/121128/-1
/FFFB4FF622DOF9DO/viewpoints-courts-have-forced-states-hand-on-prison-crowding
(discussing opposition and difficult passage of the modest reform).
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states including Louisiana by arguing
that growing old in jail is part of
2 65
the punishment for the crime.
B. Risks
We are in an unstable moment for penal law and policy reform.
Release-valve reforms pose high risks for regression as well as the
potential for progress past old political mires. There is a looming risk
of potential backlash if public safety is perceived as being jeopardized
by the hasty culling of prisoners for early release. Misaimed slashes at
needed reentry programs heighten the risk of backsliding.
1. Public Safety and Backlash
Public officials pursuing early release, sentence reduction, and
alternatives to incarceration reforms proceed gingerly with the
knowledge that public backlash looms if a prisoner on release
commits a lurid crime.266 Backlash can destroy political careers and
send policy in a sharp pendulum swing backwards, potentially to the
point of even greater severity shift and more policies that add to the
incarceration budgetary burden.
The recent and extremely short-lived attempt at a modest early
release measure that sparked fierce accusations and political
repercussions in Illinois offers a prime example and cautionary tale.
To relieve the intense pressures on the state budget and "standingroom-only" overcrowding in prisons, in September 2009, former
Illinois Department of Corrections Director Michael Randle
implemented MGT-Push that allowed prisoners to start accumulating
"good time" credit for early release upon entry into jail rather than
waiting until after the prisoner has served sixty days in state prison,
which may be long after entry into a county jail.267 A mere three
months into the program, an Associated Press news report accused
the Department of Corrections and Illinois Governor Pat Quinn of "a
265. See, e.g., Michelle Millhollon, Medical Expenses for Elderly Inmates Are Costly to
State, ADVOCATE (La.), Aug. 8, 2010, 2010 WLNR 15922402 (discussing opposition in
Louisiana to early release for the elderly on several grounds, including that growing old in
jail is part of the punishment for the crime).
266. See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 73 (noting that if even one prisoner under Colorado
Governor Bill Ritter's early release program "goes berserk" as did a prisoner released
early by former Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee, then "Ritter will pay a political price
no matter how carefully the parole board screened [the prisoner]").
267. See generally, e.g., YOUNG, supra note 255 (giving a history of the reform); Patrick
Yeagle, Report: Early PrisonerRelease Not a Scandal,ILL. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2010), http://
www.illinoistimes.com/Springfield/article-7966-report-early-prisoner-release-not-ascandal.html (citing Young's report).
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secret change in policy" of releasing more than 850 prisoners early to
save money.268
The political and policy repercussions were swift. For his
enterprising effort to better manage public resources, Randle was
punished by the de facto demise of what had appeared to be a
promising career in Illinois and ousted from office.269 In a fiercely
contested and close gubernatorial race, Governor Quinn faced
accusations that the MGT-Push program had led to the "secret" early
release of "hardened criminals" who had gone on to commit more
"crimes such as domestic battery, assault, and murder. ' 27 ° Perhaps
most damaging to the public at large and the public fisc, as a result of
inflammatory and false accusations, not only did the state abandon
MGT-Push's modest calculation reform, which had only released
1,745 prisoners an average of thirty-six days early, but the state
altogether dismantled its thirty-year-old program of early release.2 7'
As a result, the number of prisoners with which Illinois must struggle
to manage in a time of intense budgetary strain surged "to an all-time
high of 48,760" in February 2011.272
Risks of horrific reoffending by someone released early are not
merely imagined, of course-they can materialize in headlinegrabbing tragedy. It only takes one heart- and gut-wrenching tragedy
to brand the public imagination and jolt penal law and policy.
Cognitively, we tend to overestimate the probability of risk when we
reason from a salient event because we neglect the denominatorsthe overall frequency of events-in favor of focusing on the salient

268. John O'Connor, AP Report: Illinois Prisons Shave Terms, Secretly Release
Inmates, ST. J.-REG. (Il1.) (Dec. 13, 2009), http://www.sj-r.comlarchive/x1479444730/APreport-Illinois-prisons-shave-terms-secretly-release-inmates (reprinting the Associated
Press news report).
269. See, e.g., Edith Brady-Lunny, Fallout from Controversial Program Crowds
Prisons,PANTAGRAPH (I11.) (Feb. 20, 2011), http://www.pantagraph.com/news/local
/article_065f6b74-3b7f-lle-b378-001cc4c02eO.html (describing the effective demise of
Randle's political career); Editorial, Prison Chief Is Victim of Political Games, CHI. SUNTIMES, Sept. 3, 2010, 2010 WLNR 17577938 (describing political backlash and accusations
of "early release" to save money, leading to demise and deploring axing of Randle as the
real scandal).
270. Ray Long et al., Truth-Squading the Governor Race, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 29, 2010, at 6
(discrediting these allegations); see also Op-Ed., Scary 'Early Release' Tales Untrue, CHI.
SUN-TIMES (Oct. 28, 2010), http://www.suntimes.eom/opinions/2247801-474/release-prison
-program-quinn-early.html (citing the report by Young, supra note 255, as a basis for
undermining these criticisms).
271. Brady-Lunny, supra note 269; see also Long et al., supra note 270 (noting a modest
reduction of an average of thirty-six days from MGT-Push program).
272. Brady-Lunny, supra note 269.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
numerator,

the horror story come

[Vol. 90

true.273 Probability neglect

particularly occurs when strong emotions such as fear, anger, and
sadness are elicited by a highly salient event.274
The home invasion, rape, robbery, and murder of the Petit family
in Chesire, Connecticut by two repeat offenders released early on
parole is a recent and tragic example. 275 The rapists and killers were
Joshua Komisarjevsky and Steven J. Hayes, who both had long
histories of burglaries.276 For their most recent crimes before the Petit
burglary and killings, Hayes was sentenced to five years and released
after three; Komisarjevsky was sentenced to nine years and released
after five.277

Komisarjevsky and Hayes committed the kind of lurid horrific
crime that is the worst nightmare of the public and of politicians
contemplating early release. They clubbed the family's father, Dr.
William A. Petit, Jr., over the head and forced mother Jennifer
Hawke-Petit to withdraw money from the family bank account.278
Back at the family residence less than fifteen minutes later, the men
raped her and her eleven-year-old daughter, poured gasoline over her
and both her daughters, and set the house on fire.279 Only William

Petit escaped, bleeding and bound, unable to rescue his wife and
daughters dying a horrific death while bound and covered with
gasoline inside the inferno. 280

The Petit tragedy became a powerful basis for critiquing
Connecticut's early release program. As the New York Times
recounted:
The criminal justice system failed to treat Mr. Hayes and Mr.
Komisarjevsky as serious offenders despite long histories of
recidivism, repeatedly setting them free on parole. The suspects
never capitalized on those chances to turn their lives around,

273. For an explanation of denominator neglect when it comes to salient numerators,
see Valerie F. Reyna, How People Make Decisions That Involve Risk: A Dual-Process
Approach, 13 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 60, 64 (2004).
274. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE LAWS OF FEAR 69 (2005) (explaining the
phenomenon as a reason why laws and policies may focus intensely and be impacted
greatly by low-probability but highly salient and emotionally charged risks).
275. See Manny Fernandez & Alison Leigh Cowan, When Horror Came to a
Connecticut Family, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2007, at Al (chronicling the events that
transpired).
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
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instead apparently forming a new criminal281 alliance after
meeting at a drug treatment center in Hartford.
And as Dr. Petit's father said, briefly and powerfully, "There's 'no
28
question about it: The system didn't work ... It's too late now.
Further inflaming matters for a public still reeling from the tragedy, a
few months after the Petit murders, a "parolee stole a car at
knifepoint in Hartford, then fled to New York, where he was shot and

wounded by police. "283
In the aftermath, Connecticut sharply reversed course. In 2007,
Governor Rell curtailed parole eligibility and altogether eliminated
the prospect of parole for violent offenders. 2 4 Prison populations
surged in Connecticut, straining a budget already under pressure from
the economic downturn. 25 In another policy pendulum swing,
legislators again reversed course in 2009 and reinstated early release
for prisoners because of the large yearly savings such a release would
provide. 8 6
The effects of tragedy can linger long after, influencing law,
policy, and litigation positions. For example, Pennsylvania was among
eighteen states that united to file a brief opposing the Coleman-Plata
prisoner release order, recounting Philadelphia's experience with a
prisoner released early pursuant to a prison conditions consent decree
who went on to kill a young police officer. 287 To take another
example, Maurice Clemmons murdered four police officers execution
style in Washington, after former Governor Mike Huckabee of
Arkansas commuted his 108-year sentence. 88 Though Huckabee's
controversial practice of commuting sentences is different than penal
reforms to relieve budgetary pressures being contemplated by other
states, the Clemmons cautionary tale has nonetheless made it harder

281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Mark Pazniokas et al., Rell Halts Some Paroles, Will Deny Privilege to Violent
Offenders, HARTFORD COURANT, Sept. 22,2007, available at 2007 WLNR 18736140.

284. Id.
285. See, e.g., Cadue, supra note 1.
286. See Release Program Reinstated, HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 5, 2009, at B4,
available at 2009 WLNR 24682815 (noting that the state would "save about $4 million a
year").
287. Brief for the States of La., Ala., Alaska, Ark., Colo., Del., Ill., Mass., Mich., Miss.,
N.M., Ohio, Okla., Pa., S.C., Tenn., Tex., & Va. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants
at 27-30, Schwarzenegger v. Plata, No. 09-1233, 2010 WL 3501185, appeal granted 130 S.
Ct. 3413 (U.S. 2010).
288. See, e.g., Carroll,supra note 73 (demonstrating reluctance with the early release of
prisoners).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

for officials in budget-strapped states like Colorado and Wisconsin to
pursue early release measures, even under much more carefully
prescribed criteria.28 9
2. Misaimed Slashes
In view of the high political risk, reforms face severe obstacles
and risks of backsliding. In Michigan, former Governor Jennifer
Granholm's proposal to revive good-time credits faced steep
opposition from tough-on-crime crusaders who had successfully
secured elimination of good-time credits during the 1970s through the
1990s using the strategy of depicting dire visions of criminals released
early endangering the public safety. 290 Newly elected Michigan
Governor Rick Snyder is undoing the parole reforms that Granholm
instituted in 2009 to relieve budgetary pressures by releasing
"prisoners who had served 120% of their minimum sentence early
unless they had posed a 'very high' risk of reoffending. '' 291 In his
successful bid for office, Snyder had "caricaturized Granholm as soft
on crime.

' '292

To take another example, Oregon's Legislative Emergency
Board recently approved a release of $15 million out of the state's
emergency funds, despite having one of the worst budgetary outlooks
in the nation, rather than allow early release of prisoners.293 Oregon
had in 2009 tried to save $6 million by expanding an early release
program, but the reform was short-lived, ending in February 2010
after a campaign by "anticrime" groups imagined lurid scenarios of
inmates released early attacking and hurting others.2 94
The need to relieve budgetary pressures in less politically hotbutton ways has led to slashes in rehabilitation and reintegration
programs for prisoners, such as substance abuse treatment, inmate
education, and mental health treatment. Colorado, for example,
recently cut $1.9 million in funding for prisoner treatment programs
for substance abuse and mental health problems to address its
289. Id.
290. See Bell, supra note 258 (mentioning a few of these dangerous criminal stories);
Dawson Bell, Plan To Restore Good-Time Credits Fails 1st Test, DETROIT FREE PRESS,
May 17, 2010, 2010 WLNR 5566973.
291. Op-Ed., Undoing State Parole Reforms Could Cost State in Long Run, DETROIT
FREE PRESS (Feb. 9, 2011), http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/freep/access/2261402891.html
?FMT=ABS&date=Feb+09%2C+2011.
292. Id.
293. Peter Wong, Legislative Leaders Pledge Emergency Funds for Prisons,
STATESMAN J. (Or.), Sept. 24, 2010, 2010 WLNR 19127556.
294. See Davey, supra note 1 (giving the history of Oregon's early release reforms).
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budgetary woes after an expanded early release program to save
money got off to a rocky and controversial start; few inmates were
actually released. 295 Kansas offers another example of a state that has
turned to cutting therapeutic programs that ameliorate reoffending
and recycling of people back into the system. As a short-term stopgap
to address the budget crisis, Kansas cut its substance abuse treatment
programs-despite the fact that as many as 80% of inmates in the
Kansas system have substance abuse problems and 40% can be
considered addicts. 296 Kansas also terminated its community
residential programs for the mentally ill that had helped the mentally
ill transition back to the regular population and stay on their
medications, thereby posing less of a risk of harm to others and
themselves.297
Kansas is already witnessing the impact of its $1 million
reduction in community corrections programs in the form of people
bouncing back into the prison system because they have not been
properly prepared for reentry into the population. Kansas
Representative Colloton summed up the perverse consequences of
the cuts:
By cutting the parole officers, we've made our communities less
safe. By cutting the programs, the likelihood of recidivism has
increased. The problem is-if you eliminate these programs
entirely rather than reduce them, then trying to start them up
again and get the whole program going is very, very difficult.298
Budget cuts are impacting important rehabilitative efforts and
paradigms such as the juvenile justice system and even drug courts,
which have garnered high praise, with some dissent, 299 for efficacy as
an alternative to incarceration and for preventing reoffending. In
North Carolina, officials are considering collapsing the Department
of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention with the Department
of Correction, Crime Control, and Public Safety that governs adult
criminals.3 0 This has prompted strong concern because juvenile

295. See Patrick Malone, Besides Gashes, Lots of Cuts in Budget, PUEBLO CHIEFTAIN
(Colo.) (Feb. 20, 2011), http://www.chieftain.com/news/locallbesides-gashes-lots-of-cuts-inbudget/article_1lb5c958-3cb2-lleO-9691-001cc4cOO2eO.html (describing the budget cuts);
Mitchell, supra note 254 (describing the controversy and caution in release).
296. Cadue, supra note 1.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. See infra notes 348-56 and accompanying text.
300. Sarah Preston, Selling Juveniles Short, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., Dec. 26,
2010, 2010 WLNR 25533617.
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justice, unlike the adult corrections system, is one of the last few
strongholds of the rehabilitative ideal focused on helping juveniles
rehabilitate and reintegrate successfully in the community. 1 To take
another example, Kentucky is phasing out its family and drug court to
address a $7 million deficit as part of short-term cost-cutting measures
with long-term consequences. 32 This approach compounds concern
because it eliminates an increasingly popular and more efficacious
rehabilitative alternative to incarceration in the juvenile context,
where American ideals most strongly value rehabilitation and where
subjects are most amenable to change.
Cutting programs necessary to help ameliorate the major
problem of recidivism and aid in community reintegration creates
short-term budgetary relief at substantial long-term cost. Prisoners
are more likely to reoffend when their problems are unaddressed. 3
Budget slashes for mental health and substance abuse community
programs outside prison, as well as in prison, means that people are
unlikely to get help on the outside either, and are therefore more
likely to recidivate. 3° Since 2009, services for the mentally ill have
been slashed by a collective $2 billion across the nation, reducing
more than 4,000 inpatient beds and leaving many patients without the
treatment and medication that helped control symptoms.3"5
Moreover, once experienced personnel and infrastructure are cut, it is
costly and difficult to revive programs and get them running again at
the same level of efficacy.30 6 Dangers are aggravated when cuts for
basic rehabilitative measures and treatment to ease budgetary
shortfalls are combined with early release because people are
released unprepared to reintegrate successfully in the community.3 7

301. For a leading account of this orientation of juvenile justice, see ZIMRING, supra
note 75, at 35-48.
302. See Brenna Angel, Amid Budget Woes, Ky. Cuts Juvenile Drug Court, NPR (Jan.
28, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/01/28/133316504/amid-budget-woes-ky-cuts-juveniledrug-court (advocating that "drug courts work" and illustrating their positive effects).
303. See Cadue, supra note 1 ("If we haven't [rehabilitated them] to make them so
they're less likely to commit crimes again, then we haven't done our jobs.").
304. See, e.g., Steven Leifman, Op-Ed., No Time for Drastic Cuts, MIAMI HERALD,
Feb. 18, 2011, at 17A (chronicling problems and costs associated with mental health issues
in prisons); Ashley Powers, Cuts in Psychiatric Care on Rise, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2011, at
Al (discussing the large budget cuts various states have made and their impact).
305. Powers, supra note 304.
306. See Cadue, supra note 1.
307. Recognizing the danger, some legislators balked at supporting early release while
funding is also being cut for reintegration and rehabilitation programs. See, e.g., Joe
Piasecki, Portantino Announces Prison Reform Bill, LA CARqADA VALLEY SUN (Cal.)

(Feb. 4, 2011), http://www.lacanadaonline.com/news/tn-vsl-0204-prisons,O,1389939.story
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The increased likelihood of unsuccessful reintegration of prisoners
heightens the risk of potential backlash and more sharp swings in
penal law and policy.
IV. TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE TRANSFORMATION

Despite these cautions, the picture is far from bleak. Bright spots
and potential exemplars of the way forward are emerging amid the
fomentation of penal law and policy reforms in the laboratory of the
states, from expanding access to rehabilitative veteran's and drug
courts to diversion to mental health programs and proactive
supervised release. 3°8 The key to a sustainable and healthy
transformation of penal law and policy is reform guided by longerrange principles. Release-valve reforms'are often practice in need of
theory, prompted by an emergency-response mindset driven by
budgetary concerns as a successor to the emergency-response myopia
that fueled penal severity ramp ups. But as conservatives and liberals
alike face up to the costs of maintaining an incarceral society, more
deliberative approaches and the contours of a penal theory to guide
the way forward can also be forged. This Part explores the promise of
what the Article terms rehabilitative pragmatism and penal impact
analysis in criminal legislation and politics to orient sustainable
reform.
A.

RehabilitationPragmatism

As states search for solutions, rehabilitation is getting a revival,
though not as the old rehabilitative ideal defined in terms of the
offender's interests in rehabilitation. Rather, the goals are saving
money and serving collective interests. The changes in law and
politics point the way toward a possible shift to rehabilitation
pragmatism. Rehabilitation pragmatism is cautious and selective,
attentive to the need for evidence of efficacy, cost effectiveness, and
success, lest reforms falter and we backslide into the default of
incapacitation stagnation and enacting legislation that expressively
vents frustration rather than constructively ameliorates problems.
Rehabilitation pragmatism renders cloistered experts implementing
rehabilitative programs accountable through a demand for
transparency and evidence of efficacy in reducing recidivism and
promoting reintegration. This evidence-based approach diminishes
(noting California State Assemblyman Anthony Portantino has repeatedly reiterated the
dangers).
308. See infra Part IV.A.1-2.
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the opacity and seemingly unfettered discretion besieged by critics on
the left and right during the heyday of the rehabilitative ideal.309
Rehabilitation pragmatism is not the starry-eyed and egalitarian
hope for reclamation of every soul of the rehabilitative ideal.
Program beneficiaries will be selected for suitability and chances of
success. Rehabilitative pragmatism will be data-driven in selecting its
beneficiaries; held accountable for its costs through demand for
evidence of success; and derive its bipartisan support from the notion
of cost savings and empirical support for efficacy.
Limitation on access, in turn, poses challenges of potential
disparities in who becomes a beneficiary of sentence-mitigating
programs and who is left out that must be addressed. This Part argues
that in the turn to demanding evidence of efficacy, performance
measures and the concept of efficacy must also take into account the
distribution of benefits and burdens across groups. To address
disparities rather than ignore them, programming must also have
culturally conscious components to take into account communityprevalent burdens that render particular groups vulnerable.
1. A Cost-Conscious, Data-Driven Selective Approach
Colorado, typically viewed as a moderate state, and Texas, the
epitome of a tough-on-crime state, offer intriguing examples of
criminal justice reform made possible by the social meaning shift in
viewing harshness-mitigating measures as cost savings. Consider
Colorado's successfully enacted House Bill 1352,310 which had wide
bipartisan sponsorship. 1 The bill lowers the penalties for a range of
drug crimes and directs that part of the cost savings will be used for
treatment programs, reflecting the view of prosecutors and defense
attorneys and Republicans and Democrats alike that offenders should
get more rehabilitation rather than jail.3 12 The orientation shift of
Colorado's narcotics laws is reflected in the bill's revision to the
309. For an account of the rehabilitative ideal, see supra Part I. For a summary of
critiques of the past, see George F. Cole, A Return to Punishment, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19,
1978, at CN20 (noting critiques of not only efficacy but "the pervasiveness of the
discretion required by the treatment model" that delegated immense power to cloistered
experts).
310. Act of May 25, 2010, ch. 259, 2010 Colo. Sess. Laws 1162.
311. See id.; see also Debi Brazzale, HB1O-1352: Lawmakers Unite Behind New
Approach to Drug Offenders, STATE BILL NEWS (Colo.) (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www
.statebillnews.comI2OlO/O2/hblO-1352-awmakers-unite-behind-new-approach-to-drugoffenders/ (reporting that Democrats and Republicans have united in support of the bill).
312. Jessica Fender, More Rehab, Less Jail in Drug-Reform, DENV. POST, Feb. 24,
2010, at B1, available at http://www.denverpost.com/ci_14459351.
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legislative declaration prefacing Colorado's narcotics laws. The bill
now interjects two key provisions reflecting the change in penal
theory and approach. As amended, the statement of penal purposes
now provides:
(b) Successful, community-based substance abuse treatment
and education programs, in conjunction with mental health
treatment as necessary, provide effective tools in the effort to
reduce drug usage and criminal behavior in communities.
Therapeutic intervention and ongoing individualized treatment
plans prepared through the use of meaningful and proven
assessment tools and evaluations offer a potential alternative to
incarceration in appropriate circumstances and should be
utilized accordingly.
(c) Savings recognized from reductions in incarceration rates
should be dedicated toward funding community-based
treatment options and other mechanisms that are accessible to
all of the state's counties for the implementation and
continuation of such programs. 313
The legislation reduces the offense of possessing between eight
and twelve ounces of marijuana-a former felony punishable by up to
six years in prison-to a misdemeanor punishable by up to eighteen
months in prison.314 Possession of between one and two ounces of
marijuana is converted from a crime punishable by up to eighteen
months in prison to a fine-only offense.315 The sentences are also
substantially scaled back for a variety of other simple possession
crimes
involving
drugs
such
as cocaine,
heroin,
and
31
6
methamphetamine.
The power of rehabilitation pragmatism to bridge worldviews
and enable action is demonstrated by the call to action by one of the
Republican sponsors of the bill, Representative Mike Waller, who is
also a former prosecutor. Waller explained, "It's time to switch our
focus from being tough on crime to being smart on crime .... This
bill is about how we can get the best bang for our public-safety

313. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-18-401(b)-(c) (2011).
314. § 18-18-406(4)(b).
315. § 18-18-406(3)(a).
316. See § 18-18-203(2)(a)(XI) (classifying heroin as schedule I); § 18-18-204 (2)(a)(IV)
(classifying cocaine as schedule I); § 18-18-403.5 (classifying possession of four grams or
less of a schedule I or II controlled substance as a class 6 felony and possession of more
than two grams of methamphetamine as a class 4 felony).
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'
dollars."317
Encapsulating the turn away from incapacitation
stagnation that has reached conservatives as well as liberals, Waller
explained, "I'm convinced that warehousing people who are addicts
doesn't do anything to solve the problem.""31 Notably, the reasons
given for rehabilitation are framed in terms of collective concerns
rather than the concern for the individual under the old rehabilitative
ideal. This redefinition of the interests at stake has helped criminal
law reform and the politics of crime and punishment progress beyond
the roadblocks of the past. 1
Texas offers another intriguing example of how exploring
alternatives to incarceration can gain bipartisan appeal as a measure
to reduce budgetary pressures.3 20 Texas's "tough-on-crime"
reputation has given it the political cover and credibility to be a
leader in criminal law reform that mitigates penal harshness in a
politically palatable way couched in the more neutral idiom of
relieving budgetary pressures."'
In 2006, inmate projections indicated Texas needed to add 17,000
prison beds at a cost of $2 billion.322 To begin tackling the issue, Texas
Governor Rick Perry was about to advocate building three new
prisons, costing an estimated $560 million, when instead
Representative Jerry Madden proposed investing in a package of
alternatives to incarceration and rehabilitative approaches at a much
lower cost of $240 million.3 23 The approach included such measures as
diversion to mental health and drug treatment programs rather than
prison; proactive probation and parole supervision to prevent
violations; creating short-term jails for people serving less than two
years; and crime prevention through early intervention, such as
helping low-income mothers.3 24 Madden, a West Point graduate, had
no worries about appearing Texas-style tough and communicated that

317. See Brazzale, supra note 311.
318. Jeffrey Wolfe, Lawmakers Propose Changes to Drug Sentencing, 9NEWS.COM
(Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.9news.comlnews/locallstory.aspxstoryid=133332&catid=346.
319. See supra Part I.
320. See Cadue, supra note 1 (discussing the support in both the state's Senate and
House, as well as the Governor's office).
321. See id. (discussing the Texas reforms); Richard Fausset, Prison Reforms No
Longer Taboo for Conservatives,L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2011, at 1 (discussing how criminal
justice reform has been made palatable to Texas conservatives through cost savings).
322. Mike Klein, Thinking Outside the Cell: Texas Innovates To Correct Course in
Prison System, GA. PUB. POL'Y FOUND. (Apr. 20, 2010), http://www.gppf.org/article.asp
?RT=&p=pub/GovernmentReformEdcorrections100420.htm.
323. Id.
324. See Cadue, supra note 1 (mentioning the reforms); Klein, supra note 322
(mentioning Madden's recommendations).
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calm to the governor, saying, "[t]here is nobody who thinks Texas is
soft on crime.... You're not soft on crime by doing something that's

smart. "325
By 2010, Madden could say with justifiable pride that rather than
having to bear the burden of increasing incarceration by 17,000, the
latest projections indicate "we don't need to build any more for the
next three, four or five years. "326 Rather than the crippling dramatic
population increase, "Texas [has] reduced its adult prison population
by 1,257 inmates" and kept juveniles under twenty-one from
criminogenic adult prisons.3 27 Targeted rehabilitation appeals across
worldviews to conservatives as well because of the potential for
cutting long-run costs and the pragmatic logic of seeking costeffective solutions. As Madden put it:
There are three types of prisoners. There are prisoners who will
always come back when you let them out, those who will never
come back when you let them out and those in the middle who
we call the swingers. They may
or may not come back. It
32
depends on what we do for them. 1
Madden's plainspoken logic encapsulates the new rehabilitative
pragmatism. We are well past the time of starry-eyed and egalitarian
hope for the redemption of all. The rationale of rehabilitation is being
redefined away from the interest of the prisoner in redemption, an
ideal that has lost its political and moral power to stitch together a
broad-based social consensus because of fractures in worldviews of
what we should value normatively. Instead rehabilitative pragmatism
is centered on the public interest in safety and reducing costs in the
most cost-effective manner.3 29 Rehabilitation pragmatism is cautious
and selective, with a greater reliance on scientific data in selecting
participants who are more apt to succeed and most in need of
intervention in a system that must practice triage because of chronic
overload.
Rehabilitative pragmatism as a penal philosophy orients policy
toward the practice of "evidence-based rehabilitation." A subset of
evidence-based practice, evidence-based rehabilitation calls for
325.
326.
327.
328.

Klein, supra note 322.
Cadue, supra note 1.
Klein, supra note 322.
Id.

329. See Jessica S. Henry, The Second Chance Act of 2007, 45 CRIM. L. BULL. 416, 419
(2009) ("Rehabilitation, with an eye to reentry, has been repackaged, not as a way to
improve the individual offender for his or her own sake, but rather as a way to improve
public safety for all of society.").
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structuring rehabilitative programs to generate measurable outcomes
and renders opaque expert judgment calls more transparent and
readily evaluated through a demand for evidence of efficacy.330 An
emphasis on evidence of efficacy is a more widely appealing idiom in
a time of ascendant scientism that has supplanted normative, moral,
or religious ideals that formerly helped give the rehabilitative ideal
added appeal. Evidence-based rehabilitation is "harder-edged" than
the rehabilitative ideal and "characterized by cost-benefit assessment,
meta-analysis, offender 'accountability,' dangerousness screens,
intermediate sanctions, coerced treatment, and an overriding
'
emphasis on public safety."331
The data-driven aspect of "evidencebased" reforms is also spreading to other criminal reform contexts,
such as sentencing.332
In the search for more sustainable solutions to incapacitation and
incarceral domination, evidence-based approaches are catching on.
On the state level, California, which has the highest recidivism rates
in the nation, at seventy percent,333 offers a prime example. Leading
criminologist and California penal reformer Joan Petersilia has
advocated evidence-based rehabilitation and backed the call by
indicating that "[w]ell-run, well-targeted educational and vocational
programs, substance abuse treatment, cognitive behavioral therapies,
and reentry partnerships can reduce recidivism by 5-30 percent. 3 34 In
2007, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed into law California's
Public Safety and Offender Rehabilitation Services Act of 2007,
which has the stated aim of "[p]roviding sustainable funding for
improved, evidence-based probation supervision practices and
capacities" to improve recidivism rates in California.3 35 The law
defines evidence-based
practices
and programs as those
"demonstrated by scientific research to reduce recidivism among
individuals under probation, parole, or postrelease supervision. "336

330. For analysis in the medical context, see Mary Law & Joy MacDermid,
Introduction to Evidence-Based Practice, in EVIDENCE-BASED REHABILITATION: A
GUIDE To PRACTICE 3, 7-11, 64 (Mary Law & Joy McDermid eds., 2d ed. 2008).
331. Richard Rosenfeld, Recidivism and Its Discontents, 7 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB.
POL'Y 311, 311-12 (2008).
332. See Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Practices and State Sentencing Policy: Ten
Policy Initiatives To Reduce Recidivism, 82 IND. L.J. 1307, 1308-09 (2007) (describing

effort to incorporate "evidence-based practices" in sentencing).
333. Archibold, supra note 166.
334. Joan Petersilia, California's CorrectionalParadox of Excess and Deprivation,37
CRIME & JUST. 207,212 (2008).
335. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1228(d) (West 2011).
336. § 1229(d).
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On the federal level, the Second Chance Act of 2007317 also reflects
the turn to evidence-based rehabilitation. The goal of the Second
Chance Act is to provide funding to the states as an incentive to
formulate long-range, evidence-based plans for reducing recidivism.338
Reflecting the data-focused
orientation of evidence-based
rehabilitation, the Second Chance Act of 2007 requires grant
applicants to provide "evidence-based methodology and outcome
measures" for an evaluation of the program.339
Rehabilitative pragmatism as an orienting penal theory and its
evidence-based emphasis in practice also offer guidance on how to
select who benefits from rehabilitative programs and alternatives to
incarceration. For example, the 2007 California law prescribes a logic
model that begins with risk screening for selecting candidates for
rehabilitative programs. 3 0 The logic model is predicated on research
indicating "that to achieve positive outcomes, correctional agencies
must provide rehabilitative programs to the right inmates, at the right
time, and in a manner consistent with evidence-based programming
design."3 4' A related approach is the use of risk assessment
instruments to steer discretion in determining who is eligible for
parole and early release. This approach is also being incorporated
into state practice. For example, by changing its parole eligibility and
risk assessment procedures in 2008, Mississippi was able to release
3,076 prisoners early, with a median sentence reduction of thirteen
months and a low recidivism rate because of improved risk
3 42
assessment.
Rehabilitation pragmatism as the successor penal theory has the
advantage of mustering bipartisan support because it is suffused with
meanings that can appeal to conservatives and liberals.343 Telling the
public that rehabilitation can work, and providing data on how the
337. Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (2008) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.).
338. §§ 3,111,212,122 Stat. at 658, 669-71,680-83.
339. § 101(d)(3).
340. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1229(c)(2).
341.

CAL. DEP'T CORR. & REHAB., EVIDENCE-BASED REHABILITATION REFORM

PROJECT 3 (2009).
342. JFA INST., REFORMING MISSISSIPPI'S PRISON SYSTEM 4-5 (2010), available at

http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewcenteronthestatesorg/lnitiati
ves/PSPP/MDOCPaper.pdf?n=8407.
343. Deliberation and progress on polarizing and fiercely contested issues is better
facilitated when law and policy are infused with a surfeit of meanings that appeal to and
affirm people of multiple and divergent worldviews, an approach Dan Kahan calls
"expressive overdetermination." Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 115, 145-48 (2007).
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shared interest in safety and reform is served, is more effective in
building coalitions to facilitate progress than preaching from a
particular normative worldview. 3" The powerful potential of
rehabilitation pragmatism is demonstrated by the very recent call
among conservatives for bipartisan examination of rehabilitative
fiscal and human costs of
programs as an alternative to the crippling
3 45
incarceration.
of
rates
high
maintaining
2. Ameliorating Potential Disparate Impact
The first hurdles to surmount in criminal justice reform are
political and judicial inertia. Our historical moment is helping elevate
us past these obstacles. But we must proceed with caution and care
over a second challenge. In the move to rehabilitative pragmatism
and evidence-based practice and program assessment, we must have
the courage to confront a longstanding challenge in criminal justice:
inequity, particularly racial disproportionality, in who bears the
burden of penal severity and who benefits from measures of mercy.
Success cannot be defined only in terms of generic program group
and control group comparisons. Performance measures must be
attentive as to which groups are rendered eligible for rehabilitative
programming and sentence-mitigating benefits, and which groups
may be disproportionately left out. Programming must be designed
with differential cultures across groups in mind to ameliorate
disparities.
The risk of inequities in burdens and benefits across groups
posed by selective rehabilitative innovations is demonstrated by drug
courts. Though drug courts began as a tactic to relieve some of the
pressures of high drug caseloads overburdening the courts through
accelerated processing, the contemporary form of drug courts began
spreading when it became anchored in rehabilitative goals and
approaches.3 46 Criminal justice actors, including judges, act alternately
as cheerleaders and "tough love" providers toward overcoming the
problem and reducing the risk of recidivism.347 Drug courts reflect the

344. Cf. Mary D. Fan, Post-Racial Proxies: Unity-Rebuilding Frames for
AntidiscriminationValues, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 905, 939-42 (2011) (exploring the virtues
of approaches that illuminate interest convergence to build coalitions and navigate fiercely
polarized politics).
345. See supra note 3.
346. See Morris B. Hoffman, Commentary, The Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. REV.
1437, 1461 (2000) (giving a history of drug courts in the United States).
347. Dwight Vick & Jennifer Lamb Keating, Community-Based Drug Courts:
EmpiricalSuccess, 52 S.D. L. REV. 288, 291 (2007).
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selective orientation of rehabilitation pragmatism through screening
criteria for potential beneficiaries. Typically, candidates must not be
facing ancillary nondrug charges or have prior violent felony
convictions, and many jurisdictions exclude those facing drug
distribution rather than drug possession charges.34 8
Though there have been disputes about efficacy,3 49 recent studies
indicate that drug courts are more efficacious compared to traditional
incarceration in breaking the cycle of criminality spurred by addiction
and reducing recidivism.35 ° Drug courts also save taxpayers money in
the long run despite potentially higher start-up costs. California,
which has about twelve percent of the nation's drug courts,
commissioned a study that found the state realized a combined net
benefit of over $9 million a year through the efforts of nine drug
courts.35 ' The savings came from the cheaper cost per person diverted
to drug courts as well as outcome benefits from reducing recidivism. 2
The New Jersey Supreme Court has also lauded the success of drug
courts in reducing recidivism and saving the state money, noting that
"[t]he average cost per year to house an inmate in state prison is
$34,218 compared to $17,266 to give that same offender the
rehabilitative services of Drug Court, including six months of inpatient treatment. ' 35 3 Though not a perfect instrument-as no penal
instrument is in reality-and in need of refinement, drug courts have
been widely lauded as a better alternative to the status quo and
default of prison.354
348. See Michael M. O'Hear, Rethinking Drug Courts: RestorativeJustice as a Response
to Racial Injustice, 20 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 463, 469-77, 479 (2009).
349. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 346, at 1497-98 (critiquing scant evidence of
efficacy as of the time of writing in 2000).
350. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-219, ADULT DRUG
COURTS: EVIDENCE INDICATES RECIDIVISM REDUCTIONS AND MIXED RESULTS FOR

OTHER OUTCOMES 45 (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05219.pdf
(finding a re-arrest reduction of 10% to 30% in a review of several programs); Eric L.
Jensen & Clayton Mosher, Adult Drug Courts: Emergence, Growth, Outcome Evaluations,
and the Need for a Continuum of Care, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 443, 463 (2006); Michael
Rempel, Dana Fox-Kralstein & Amanda Cissner, Drug Courts: An Effective Treatment
Alternative, 19 CRIM. JUST. 34, 35 (2004). But see Scott W. Henggeler et. al., Juvenile Drug
Court: Enhancing Outcomes by Incorporating Evidence-Based Treatment, 74 J.
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 42, 53 (2006) (finding the use of drug courts did not
show evidence of reduction in re-arrest rates despite observed reductions in antisocial
behavior or increased use of evidence-based practices).

351.

ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS (CAL.), CALIFORNIA DRUG COURT COST

ANALYSIS STUDY 1-2,4 (2003).

352. Id.
353. State v. Meyer, 930 A.2d 428, 433 (N.J. 2007).

354. See, e.g., Kimberly Y.W. Holst, A Good Score? Examining Twenty Years of Drug
Courts in the United States and Abroad, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 73, 104-06 (2010) (assessing
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Concerns have arisen, however, over the risk of racial
disproportionality in who gets selected for the benefit and who
succeeds in actually securing the benefit-and who does not and is
subject to the hammer of harsher incarceration terms.355 Empirical
studies of various drug court programs have been mixed as to
whether there is racial disparity in who benefits from drug court
programs.3 56 Barriers to entry and programming pose a risk of racial
disproportionality because social and economic disadvantages and
structural inequities impact the likelihood of having a disqualifying
conviction and whether one will succeed in addiction treatment.357
Empirical studies into the reasons for disparities shed light on
how the dangers of aggravating racial disparities may be mitigated.
For example, a study found that the nearly twofold disparity in
success rates between blacks and whites in ten Missouri drug courts is
in part because "African-Americans were more likely to use cocaine,
a drug associated with high relapse rates" and programs were not
providing the specialized treatment needed for cocaine addiction. 58
Another recent study also attributed disparate post-program

critiques and benefits of drug courts and concluding drug courts are far superior and more
socially desirable than the costly default of incarceration); J. Scott Sanford & Bruce A.
Arrigo, Lifting the Cover on Drug Courts: Evaluation Findings and Policy Concerns, 49
INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 239, 240-45, 252-55

(2005)

(collecting and analyzing an array of empirical studies of efficacy).
355. See, e.g., Josh Bowers, ContraindicatedDrug Courts, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 783, 785,
803-04 (2008) (collecting critiques of drug courts); O'Hear, supra note 348, at 460-77, 48082 (noting risk of aggravating racial disparities); cf. Eric J. Miller, Embracing Addiction:
Drug Courts and the False Promise of Judicial Interventionism, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1479,
1568-69 (2004) (contending that there may be a risk of coercion of the socioeconomically
disadvantaged into drug courts).
356. Compare, e.g., Randall T. Brown, Megan Zuelsdorff & Michele Gassman,
Treatment Retention Among African Americans in the Dane County Drug Treatment
Court, 48 J. OFFENDER REHAB. 336, 337 (2009) (noting how smaller studies within
individual treatment centers did not find a difference in completion rates by ethnicity, but
a larger study found that Blacks had a much greater post-treatment recidivism rate than
Whites and other minorities), with Anne Dannerbeck et al., Understanding and
Responding to Racial Differences in Drug Court Outcomes, 5 J. ETHNICITY SUBSTANCE
ABUSE 1, 2, 10, 17-18 (2006) (finding based on study of ten Missouri drug courts that
African Americans are nearly half as likely as whites to complete the drug court program
in part because of African Americans were more likely to use cocaine, a drug with high
relapse rates), and Michael Rempel & Christine Depies DeStefano, Predictors of
Engagement in Court-Mandated Treatment: Findings at the Brooklyn Treatment Court,
1996-2000, in DRUG COURTS IN OPERATION: CURRENT RESEARCH 87, 91 (James J.

Hennessy & Nathaniel J. Pallone eds., 2001) (discussing mixed findings).
357. Bowers, supra note 355, at 805; O'Hear, supra note 348, at 480-82.
358. Dannerbeck et al., supra note 356, at 17-18.
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recidivism rates to potentially disparate rates of cocaine use and
pointed to the need for specific programs.359
Empirical work on disparities suggests a need to take into
account cultural differences between communities in two ways. First,
programs need to take into account research findings that "AfricanAmericans often use drugs for relief from oppressive social problems
over which they have no control" and address alternative ways of
coping.3" Second, programs also need to be better attuned to the
stigma surrounding the addiction as mental disease model in the
the confrontational
African-American community and change
3 61
approach and social meaning of treatment.
Cultural context is important for rehabilitative programming in
general, across a range of offenses. Rehabilitative programming in the
criminal justice system can draw lessons from advances in approaches
taken in the public health context, which deploys community-tailored,
culturally attuned outreach for groups disproportionately suffering
from health impairments.3 62 The accumulated experience of public
health interventions demonstrates that context is important to
enhancing efficacy. Meanings and motivations may differ across
communities, and the messages need to be tailored to address
different meanings and experiences because of societal, structural,

359. Brown et al., supra note 356, at 337-38, 341-42.
360. Dannerbeck et al., supra note 356, at 18.
361. Id.
362. See, e.g., S.F. DEP'T OF PUB. HEALTH COMM. BEHAVIORAL SERVS., PEER TO
PEER OUTREACH PROGRAM FOR AFRICAN AMERICAN MENTAL HEALTH CONSUMERS

3-4 (2007) (discussing how cultural incompatibility and stigma impairs the delivery of
mental health care to African Americans and how to ameliorate overrepresentation in
emergency settings through culturally sensitive outreach); THE ADVISORY BD.,
COMMUNITY OUTREACH PROGRAMS TARGETED AT SPECIFIC PATIENT POPULATIONS:

ORIGINAL INQUIRY BRIEF 1-18 (2005) (advocating for tailoring public health community
outreach programs and services to minority and indigent populations and examining such
programs); Sheryl Kataoka, Douglas K. Novins & Catherine DeCarlo Santiago, The
Practice of Evidence-Based Treatments in Ethnic Minority Youth, 19 CHILD &
ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY CLINICS AM. 775-78, 785 (2010) (emphasizing the import of
taking into account cultural and community factors to enhance the efficacy of delivery of
evidence-based mental health treatments to minority youths, who have substantial unmet
needs); Yoku Shaw-Taylor, Culturally and Linguistically Appropriate Health Care for
Racial or Ethnic Minorities: Analysis of the US Office of Minority Health's Recommended
Standards, 62 HEALTH POL'Y 211, 211-15 (2002) (discussing the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services ("DHHS") Office of Minority Health's standards on
culturally and linguistically appropriate services in health care to better address the needs
of cultural, racial, and ethnic minorities); Laura B. Wilson & Sharon P. Simson, Planning
Minority Health Programs To Eliminate Health Status Disparity, 14 EVALUATION &
PROGRAM PLAN. 211, 211-13, 218 (1991) (arguing that cultural awareness is needed to
mitigate substantial health disparities between minority and majority populations).
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and cultural context to maximize buy-in and efficacy 63
Disadvantaged communities of color suffer the burdens of the
absence of male figures in the community because of high
incarceration rates, alternate models of esteem for outlaws and
outsiders because of marginalization, impaired employment
prospects, and other structural challenges.3 " Such structural factors
should be taken into account in designing effective programs.
Some states have experimented with efforts to take culture into
account to improve rehabilitative program efficacy. After the
Sentencing Project reported that Iowa incarcerated African
Americans at the highest disproportion compared to Caucasians, at a
13.6 times greater rate, two correctional districts in Iowa in 2009
implemented culturally responsive re-entry programming for African
Americans to better address the issue.365 Iowa has reported
encouraging preliminary data suggesting lower recidivism rates for
African Americans in the culturally responsive program compared to
a control group of similar race, sex, age, crime type, and preprogram
3 66

risk score.

To take another example, Casper, Wyoming is home to a
residential substance abuse treatment program for American Indians
referred by the Bureau of Indian Affairs for treatment as an alternate
sentencing option for misdemeanants.36 7 The aim is to deliver
" 'effective and culturally sensitive treatment services to American
Indians, who have the highest prevalence of substance abuse and
dependence among the racial and ethnic groups in the United
States,' " the program's director has explained.3 68 The program
incorporates American Indian staff and program materials, as well as
363. See, e.g., Kataoka et al., supra note 362, at 782 (discussing the importance of
taking preliminary community outreach steps to ensure programmatic cultural sensitivity
and, thereby, increase success of interventions).
364. Cf Sandra D. Lane et al., Editorial, Structural Violence and Racial Disparity in
HIV Transmission, 15 J. HEALTH CARE FOR POOR & UNDERSERVED 319-26 (2004)
(examining how societal patterns of disproportionate incarceration of people of color, a
low male-to-female ratio because men of color die younger and are incarcerated in severe
disproportion, residential segregation, circumscribed access to health services, and other
macro factors structurally lead to disproportionate burdens in community health).
365. IOWA DEP'T OF CORR., ONE-STOP REENTRY REDUCES DISPROPORTIONATE
REPRESENTATION 1 (2011), http://www.doc.state.ia.us/Research/JanllOneStopReentry
.pdf.
366. IOWA DEP'T OF CORR., ONE-STOP REENTRY: THROUGH OCTOBER 31, 2010, at
2-3 (2010), http://www.firstdcs.com/OneStopReentryStats2010 10.pdf. A larger sample
size is needed, however, to better evaluate statistical significance. Id.
367. CasperRe-Entry Center Expands Services with Bureau of Indian Affairs Treatment
Program, CMTY. EDUC. CTRS. (Jan. 15, 2009), http://www.cecintl.com/news_2009_03.html.
368. Id.
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emphasizes respecting, understanding, and incorporating American
Indian values.3 6 9
Moving from the laboratories of the states to international
examples, we can also draw insights from Australian attempts to
ameliorate disparities in imprisonment among Aborigines. Australian
criminologists trying to redress disparities have argued "it is essential
to take into account the historical context and social and cultural
frameworks" and how the meanings of messages may differ across
communities.37 ° Cultural tailoring does not mean segregation or
othering as a high-risk group.37' Rather it means offering
complementary programs that affirm and recognize community
meanings to maximize buy-in and efficacy rather than taking an ill372
fitting, one-size-fits-all approach.
Disparities in eligibility can also be addressed by having the
courage, in compelling cases, to expand access to rehabilitative
programming. Violent offenders may have potentially treatable
traumas desperately in need of redress for sustainable change. The
risks may be greater, but so are the potential benefits of addressing
the root problem rather than recycling violent offenders through the
system and paying the high costs of their incarceration. A recent
salient success story illustrates. Police, prosecutors, and a forwardthinking judge collaborated to divert Sergeant Brad Eifert to
Veteran's Court though he faced potential life sentences for trying to
commit "suicide by cop" by firing near officers-serious charges that
ordinarily would render him ineligible for diversion.373 Believing that
Eifert was yet another veteran falling into the increasing problem of
veterans aiming to kill themselves rather than officers, authorities
collaborated so that Eifert could finally get treatment for the root

369. Id.
370. Peter Mals et al., Adapting Violence Rehabilitation Programsfor the Australian
Aboriginal Offender, 30 J. OFFENDER REHABILITATION 121, 122-23, 131-34 (2000)
(advising that anger management programs for violent offenders need to take into account
Aboriginal context and group-specific meanings and be more culturally tailored); see also
Kevin Howells et al., Developing Programs for Violent Offenders, 2 LEGAL &
CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL.

117, 123-28 (1997) (assessing rehabilitative programming

and advising of the import of assessing different needs between groups to ensure that
content and format of rehabilitative programming is attuned to the group context).
371. Cf. Mals et al., supra note 370, at 129-32 (discussing concerns that taking cultural
context into account does not reduce segregation).
372. Cf, e.g., id. (discussing how using community members to teach and to spread the
word about therapeutic programs may enhance buy-in and how efficacy is impaired if the
community is not engaged).
373. See Erica Goode, Coming Together To Fightfor a Troubled Veteran, N.Y. TIMES,
July 18, 2011, at Al (chronicling Eifert's story).
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cause of his violent behavior after returning from combat duty in
Iraq.374

Admittedly,

altering

program

eligibility

is

a

more

controversial approach than creating better and more efficacious
programming sensitive to racial context. Such eligibility-impacting
measures must underscore shared interests in the larger payoff of
addressing treatable traumas.
The larger lesson to take from the drug court example is that
evidence-based practice needs to be racial-disparity sensitive and race
and culture conscious in program design and caution needs to be
tempered with compassion and courage. It is not enough to have
evidence of efficacy and cost-effectiveness without further asking the
questions of whether there is disproportionality in who benefits and
who is burdened and why. This approach ameliorates some of the
risks of aggravating inequity posed by the selective approach of
rehabilitative pragmatism. Empirical evidence-based practice that
investigates racial impact can illuminate ways to improve program
design in order to minimize the risk of disparities and ensure that
groups that historically have been disproportionately harmed by
penal severity can also share in the benefit of the turn toward
rehabilitation pragmatism.
B.

PenalImpact Analysis in Crafting Criminaland Sentencing Law

The shift in the social meaning of penal reform has also enabled
another type of reform to emerge in the laboratory of the states that
cuts to the core of the problem that scholars have long deplored
under the broad heading of overcriminalization.375 Part of the
overcriminalization problem is the inflation of penal severity over the
decades as a way for legislators to express that they are tough on
crime without having to bear the full costs of allocating sufficient
resources to enforce expanding criminal codes.376 Political points are
scored on the front end while on the back end criminal justice
actors-from overburdened defense attorneys, to prosecutors, to
prison officials-must struggle to bear the burden. The interest of
legislators in looking tough through ratcheting up criminal law can
intersect with prosecutors trying to manage the burden of the
explosion of criminal laws because harsher penalties give prosecutors

374. Id.
375. See infra note 379 and accompanying text.
376. Stuntz, PathologicalPolitics,supra note 7, at 523-26.
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more leverage to secure guilty pleas to triage the flow of cases.377 The
result is enactment of laws that pose severe budgetary burdens
without sufficient consideration of fiscal impact.
These alignments and the resulting accretion of an abundance of
criminal laws and penal harshness have severely burdened the
criminal justice and correctional systems. As the Little Hoover
Commission investigating California's prisons crisis put it, "laws
passed with no thought to their cumulative impact" have put the
system in a "tailspin."3 8 Statutes ossify because no legislator wants to
take the initiative to cut back criminal law because of the risk of
looking soft on crime.379
As states are forced by severe budgetary shortfalls to confront
costs, however, a few states have remarkably begun to tackle the root
overcriminalization problem and the inflation of sentence severity in
criminal law framing. Budgetary crisis has opened political space, will,
and ability to tackle and redress overcriminalization and revise
definitions of crime and punishment by changing the social meaning
of such legislative action. Here again, legislators have political cover
to engage in reforms once politically infeasible such as reducing
prescribed punishments and converting former felonies to
misdemeanors because they can explain the reforms are due to fiscal
compulsion and the need to save taxpayers money rather than being
soft on crime. 8 0
In this shift to more thoughtful, forward-looking lawmaking, the
time is ripe to also adopt fiscal and community impact analysis for
criminal legislation as a reality check for the get-tough ratchet of the
politics of crime. Explicit consideration of cost savings and the fiscal
and community impact of criminal laws can ameliorate the
consequences of enacting laws on the front end without consideration
of the back end resource strain. Budget consciousness in criminal
377. See, e.g., Fan, supra note 48, at 27-28, 39-56 (discussing pressures on prosecutors
from the politics of crime); Erik Luna, The OvercriminalizationPhenomenon, 54 AM. U.
L. REV. 703, 725-26 (2005) (describing confluence of interests); Marc L. Miller & Ronald
F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 142-43 (2008) (explaining "the practical
disappearance of mens rea and the definition of criminal acts" through the arsenal of
criminal laws to charge); Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating
Degradation of American Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 644-47 (2005)
(discussing confluence of interest of legislators in avoiding looking soft on crime and
prosecutorial interest in leverage).
378. LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supranote 72, at i-ii.
379. See Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and
Mattress Tags to Overfederalization,54 AM. U. L. REV. 747,773-75 (2005).
380. For a discussion of how social meaning changes the ambit for action and reform,
see supra notes 246-48 and accompanying text.
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justice reform can create the political conditions for reforms to the
process of criminal lawmaking so that legislators consider fiscal and
community impact, rather than shift the costs to overburdened
criminal justice actors down the line.
We can draw lessons from reforms in the United Kingdom on
assessing the fiscal impact of regulations that impact business. In the
United Kingdom, a recently established Cabinet Committee has the
task of "stress-test[ing] regulatory proposals" by projecting fiscal
burdens.3 8' To ensure fiscal responsibility, regulators have the task of
ensuring, in part, that "any new regulatory cost is compensated by
cuts to the costs of old laws, and that the cut in regulatory cost must
' Businesses have the
be greater than the cost of the new regulation."382
power to be the first movers in introducing reforms to the lawmaking
process.
Criminal justice lawmaking, in dire need of an approach where
lawmakers on the front end consider the fiscal and human costs of
get-tough politics, can be influenced by inroads in lawmaking reforms
first introduced by powerful actors in other legislative contexts. In the
criminal justice context, while we may not cut old crimes to make way
for new crimes, projecting fiscal burdens of new legislation creates a
reality check and a brake on the powerful drive to criminalize.
Beyond fiscal projections, an even bolder approach would be to
require legislators contemplating creating new crimes to consider
reforms to older laws such as cutting back steep penalties or weeding
out obsolescent penal legislation to balance costs.
Consideration of fiscal costs can also pave the way for
consideration of community and human costs. Here again, the
reorientation of reform cannot neglect the need to address racial
disparities that arise from the design of criminal law and penalties.
The promise of a race-conscious approach to penal reform is
demonstrated by the bipartisan support for amending the crack
cocaine sentencing laws to reduce the notorious 100:1 disparity in the
sentencing for crack cocaine, which disproportionately plagues
communities of color.383 The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 reduced the

381. DEP'T FOR Bus. INNOVATION & SKILLS, Cutting Red Tape Committee Meets for
the First Time, NEWS DISTRIBUTION SERVICE FOR GOV'T & THE PUB. SECTOR (July 1,

2010,10:38 AM), http://nds.coi.gov.uk/content/Detail.aspx?ReleaselD=414183
&NewsArealD=2.
382. Id.
383. See, e.g., Kara Gotsch, Bipartisan Justice, Special Report: Mass Incarceration in
America, AMERICAN PROSPECT, Jan.-Feb. 2011, at A22, available at http://www.nxtbook
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disparity from 100:1 to 18:1 by raising the quantity of crack that
triggers five- and ten-year mandatory minimum sentences.38" Clearing
the political hurdle of deadlock on criminal law reform opens the
opportunity to ameliorate the ways in which criminal law structures
and aggravates racial disparities in who bears the burden of punitive
severity.
The JudicialRole in the Penal Law and Policy Foment
The role of the courts in intervening in penal law and policy must
be viewed in light of the transformations in the politics of crime and
punishment analyzed in the preceding sections. When politics are
stuck and unconstrained excess and extreme severity drift leads to
human rights violations that affront even minimum baseline Eighth
Amendment standards, courts must intervene out of necessity to
vindicate human rights.385 As Erwin Chemerinsky has argued, courts
cannot abdicate their role altogether, particularly in the prisoner
context, because the courts may be "the only entity with the will to
enforce the Constitution" given the politics of crime.3 86
But judicial intervention and supervision should be the last resort
rather than the first instinct because courts are clumsy overseers of
penal law and policy with limited power to ensure and enforce
implementation. In determining whether to intervene, the likelihood
of redress by the political branches should be a relevant factor.
There are three major difficulties in the institutional competency
of courts to oversee penal law and policy reform. The first is
distortion in the nature and focus of judicially led reform because of
the source of the judicial power to intervene. Because judicial power
to oversee prisons depends on whether there has been a
constitutional violation, which in turn is shaped by the blind spots and
areas of focus in constitutional law doctrine, judicial oversight can
lead to oddities, irregularities, and distortions in reform. California,
C.

the shift to
(tracing
.com/nxtbooks/americanprospect/20110102specialreport/#/22
bipartisan support); see also, e.g., Ian Haney L6pez, Is the "Post" in Post-Racial the
"Blind" in Color-Blind?, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 807, 817-18 (2011) ("The hundred-to-one
sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine has emerged as the quintessential
example of how the war on crime, conjoined to race, especially targeted blacks.").
384. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
385. For a recent example of such intervention, see Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910,
1922-23 (2011) (affirming a three-judge district court order for California to reduce the
overcrowding problems in its prisons, which the court found to be the primary cause of the
constitutional violations at issue).
386. Chemerinsky, supra note 47, at 311-12.
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for example, has poured money into building medical facilities rather
than redressing other areas of glaring problems, such as failure to
house prisoners-healthy or ill-by classification, aggravating the
criminogenic context of prison and the brutalities that nonviolent
offenders may face.387 Plaintiffs are in the odd posture of trying to
squeeze the massive and glaring problems of severe overcrowding
into the small box of inadequate provision of medical care, which is
just a subset and symptom of the problem that does not quite capture
the generally experienced harms of all inmates. This stems from the
Eighth Amendment doctrine's high tolerance for overcrowding
generally, but also from doctrinal concern that a minimally adequate
level of medical care must be provided.388
Second, there are structural separation-of-powers reasons
counseling against judicial policy directives as a matter of principle
that have prudential implications. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
reiterated that penal choices are a question for the political branches
rather than a court-particularly a federal court not subject to
democratic election.3 89 Penal law, policy, and theory reflect
normative, moral, and prudential judgments about competing
alternatives that courts are particularly unsuited to make for the
people. When courts do intervene, as in the case of California
detailed in Part III.A, hostility and frustration over having an entity
such as a federal receiver directing policy and state spending can
harden resistance.
The resistance aggravates the third reason why courts are
awkwardly suited to intervene in penal law and policy: the gross
inefficiencies and transaction costs of courts or judicially appointed
actors trying to direct political action. These problems are evident in
California, which has spent $82 million on blueprints for ambitious
medical facilities advocated by the Federal Receiver that have been
largely scrapped because of inability to secure political will to
implement them.3 9 Because of the inefficiencies stemming from the
tussle between political and judicially appointed actors, California
387. See Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, Nos. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, C01-1351
TEH, 2009 WL 2430820, at *40, *85-86 (E.D. Cal. & N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009) (discussing
the criminogenic consequences of breakdown of classification system).
388. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981) (holding the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is not affronted by prison
overcrowding at over capacity and improvisations such as "double ceiling" so long as there
are no "deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation").
389. E.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23-25 (2003); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S.
263, 274-75 (1980).
390. Dolan, supra note 262.
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now spends substantially more on healthcare per prisoner than other
states, yet it has had less success ameliorating serious problems in the
provision of minimally adequate care.39 ' The disconnect between
judicially appointed overseers and the political process and the power
to order without power to ensure implementation leads to waste as
preparations are for naught.
Because of these three major difficulties, judicial supervision of
penal policy is a penalty default that courts and states alike wish to
avoid. A penalty default approach sets default terms in a manner to
incentivize the better-situated party to act because the default in the
event of inaction is a suboptimal outcome that neither party
prefers.3 92 Doctrine that gives a colorable threat of intrusive judicial
intervention in the event of inaction would provide incentive for
political action to avoid the penalty default. Judicial guidance can also
magnify values underlying constitutional commitments that may be
muted in the fractious din of the politics of crime.
The very penalty default nature of judicial intervention can be
used to steer state action. This is why courts cannot bow out
altogether from the role of policing penal choices: there would be no
incentive for action to remedy deficits that may undermine
constitutional rights and basic human rights, as well as harm the
collective interest in managing human and fiscal costs. Judicial
intervention can also constitute general deterrence for other
jurisdictions and avert the need for judicial intervention elsewhere.
The power of the penalty default and a credible threat backed by
judicial willingness to actually intervene is demonstrated by how the
convening of the three-judge court jolted California into action.393
The prisoner release order of the three-judge court set California in
motion, building new prison healthcare facilities to avoid another
form of penalty default, the release of prisoners. In addition to
breaking ground on a new facility outside Stockton to house
approximately 1,700 mentally and physically ill inmates three months

391. See id.
392. The concept was formulated in the context of contracts as an incentive to get a
more knowledgeable party to disclose information that would make for a more optimal
outcome, but has been extended to myriad other contexts in logic. Ian Ayres, Ya-Huh:
There Are and Should Be Penalty Defaults, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 589, 597 (2006); Ian
Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 90, 97-101 (1989).
393. For a discussion on the action by this three-judge court, see supra Part II.
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after the prisoner release order, California is also preparing to
convert three juvenile detention centers into medical facilities.3 94

The reform with the most potential for a jolt out of
incapacitation stagnation, however, is not the building of more
facilities, even if they are mental and healthcare facilities. Rather, the
most striking aspects of California's proposed prisoner reduction plan
filed pursuant to the court order to reduce prisoners are (1) statewide
implementation of the Parole Violation Decision-Making Instrument,
which uses "scientific research to make evidenced-based decisions to
send low risk offenders to appropriate programs and high risk
offenders back to prisons"; (2) new legislation encouraging
"completion of rehabilitative programs"; (3) legislative initiatives
offering fiscal incentives for community corrections program that
"keep low-level offenders local rather than returning them to prison";
and (4) parole reentry court legislation "that allows for intensive
monitoring for parole violators in the community rather than
' The judicial nudge has helped give states
returning them to prison."395

guidance out of the mire and provided political cover for exploring
legislation that is pragmatic and rehabilitative.
Sometimes, the faster pace of political reaction may moot judicial
intervention, which proceeds at a more deliberate pace. This may be
the most desirable outcome because it secures action without costly
and clumsy judicial intervention. But particularly in the context of the
fierce and pathological politics of crime and punishment, it is
important to distinguish between a remedy for a constitutional
problem and a simple prolonging and obscuring of the pain and
unsustainability of a practice. Borrowing money and overextending
an already severely distended deficit to build four prison medical
facilities as a stopgap is not the same as a solution. The very pursuit of
such stopgaps shows why the courts cannot afford to bow out of
giving normative guidance and why an occasional nudge-or even a
push-to pathological penal law and policies as occurred in Graham
v. Floridaand Brown v. Plata are needed.

394. Dolan, supra note 262; Scott Smith, Officials Break Ground on State Prison
Project, CONTRA COSTA TIMES (Cal.), Nov. 10, 2010, at All, available at 2010 WLNR
23814850.

395. Defendants' Population Reduction Plan, Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, Nos. 2:90cv-00520 LKK JFM P, C01-1351 THE (E.D. Cal. & N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2009) in
Schwarzenegger v. Plata, No. 09-1233, Jurisdictional Statement Appendix, Appendix F,
Ex. A, at 315a-316a (Oct. 5, 2009).
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CONCLUSION

We are at an important historical juncture because of a perfect
storm of severe budgetary shortfalls and courts awakening to the role
of checking penal severity, he steep human and fiscal costs of
incarceration have changed the social meaning of mitigating penal
harshness. After years of dormancy, the Supreme Court has
awakened to the role of nudging-and even pushing-us out of
incapacitation stagnation when we desire a way out of the political
mire and its human and fiscal consequences but cannot see the way
forward. This period of transition is ripe with potential for reform as
well as dangers for backlash and backsliding. The way forward toward
sustainable penal law and policy reform is to foster and develop
practices guided by rehabilitation pragmatism and penal impact
analysis, data-driven approaches with the potential to bridge partisan
worldviews.
Clearing the threshold hurdle of the pathological politics of
crime that have kept us mired in incapacitation stagnation is not
enough. We must also take care that our rehabilitation pragmatism
and its selective approach does not aggravate the problem of racial
disparities in criminal justice through disparities in who benefits from
measures of mercy and who remains warehoused away. Evidencebased reform calls for inquiry not just into general efficacy and cost
effectiveness but an assessment of whether programs suffer from
racial disparities in beneficiaries and why. This can pave the way for
alternatives to incarceration and more efficacious rehabilitative
programs that are culturally tailored to better serve groups that are
disproportionately incarcerated. The social meaning change that is
lowering political obstacles can also open the door to deeper criminal
law reforms that tackle structural disparities in who bears the burden
of penal severity.
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